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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE AGGREGATE BURDEN OF ALCOHOL ABUSE 
BY  
RESUL CESUR 
AUGUST 2009 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Inas Rashad 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation attempts to uncover the causal relationship between alcohol abuse and 
both income growth and crime.  These two research questions are investigated in three essays: 
Essay I investigates the relationship between alcohol abuse and income growth in the United 
States; Essay II examines the impact of alcohol abuse on income growth at the international 
level; Essay III investigates the effect of alcohol abuse on crime in the united states.  
 Essay I of this dissertation uses state level data from the United States for the period 
1970-1998 to estimate the impact of alcohol abuse on income growth by utilizing per capita beer 
consumption as the measure of alcohol abuse.  Results suggest that, even though generally small, 
there is a negative relationship between alcohol abuse and income growth once the endogeneity 
between income growth and per capita beer consumption is addressed by utilizing levels of 
excise alcohol taxes and the Minimum Drinking Age Law of 21 as instruments.  These results 
indirectly favor the previous research on two dimensions: First, alcohol abuse generates a 
significant burden on the economy; Second, increases in excise alcohol taxes would be efficient 
in terms of income growth. 
ix 
 
 Essay II of this dissertation uses data from 72 countries for the period 1960-1995 to 
estimate the impact of alcohol abuse on income growth by utilizing per capita beer, wine, liquor, 
and total ethanol consumption as the measures of alcohol abuse.  Results suggest that, even 
though generally small, there is a negative significant relationship between per capita beer 
consumption and income growth once the endogeneity between income growth and per capita 
beer consumption is addressed with system GMM dynamic panel estimators.  These results show 
that per capita beer consumption is the medium of alcohol abuse not only in the United States, 
but also around the world.  Moreover, these results favor the previous research on the fact that 
alcohol abuse generates a significant burden on economies. 
 Essay III of this dissertation uses state level data from the United States for the period 
1982-2000 to investigate the relationship between crime and alcohol abuse by utilizing per capita 
beer consumption as the measure of alcohol abuse.  Potential endogeneity between per capita 
beer consumption and crime is addressed by using excise beer taxes and alcohol control 
measures as instruments.  Results show that alcohol abuse seems to have a positive impact 
overall on the crime rate.  Nevertheless, the effect is not uniform among different crime types.  In 
the case of property crime types, results suggest that alcohol abuse plays a more important role in 
crime types that require a lesser degree of organization and more spontaneity (i.e., larceny theft 
versus burglary and motor vehicle theft).  In the case of violent crime types, results suggest that 
the impact of alcohol abuse is more pressing in non-murder crime types versus murder.  These 
results have policy implications: excise alcohol taxes and alcohol control policies may play a role 
in reducing certain crime types, which are larceny theft, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, 
but not the other crime types, which are burglary, motor vehicle theft, and murder. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 Phillip J. Cook‘s recent book, ―Paying the Tab: The Costs and Benefits of Alcohol 
Control (2007),‖ starts its foreword as follows:  
“What drug provides Americans with the greatest pleasure and the greatest pain? The answer, 
hands down, is alcohol. The pain comes not only from drunk driving and lost lives but also 
addiction, family strife, crime, violence, poor health, and squandered human potential. Young 
and old, drinkers and abstainers alike, all are affected. Every American is paying for alcohol 
abuse.”  
 Likewise, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports from various years document 
that both alcohol abuse and the costs associated with alcohol abuse are common around the 
world, and affect well being of societies through various channels.    
 Hence, given the fact that alcohol abuse imposes economic and social burdens on 
societies both in the United States and all around the globe, this dissertation attempts to uncover 
the impact of alcohol abuse at the aggregate level in a general equilibrium framework in two 
dimensions.  First, this dissertation investigates the potential relationship between economic well 
being and alcohol abuse in terms of income growth both in the United States and around the 
globe.  Second, this dissertation investigates the potential relationship between alcohol abuse and 
crime in the United States.  
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Research Question 
 Before proceeding with the research question at stake, I want to introduce a definition for 
alcohol abuse, which I borrowed from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
The CDC defines alcohol abuse as follows:  
“A person can abuse alcohol without actually being an alcoholic--that is, he or she may drink too much 
and too often but still not be dependent on alcohol. Some of the problems linked to alcohol abuse include 
not being able to meet work, school, or family responsibilities; drunk-driving arrests and car crashes; 
and drinking-related medical conditions. Under some circumstances, even social or moderate drinking is 
dangerous--for example, when driving, during pregnancy, or when taking certain medications.” 
 There is no predetermined volume of alcohol consumption, on a single occasion, that 
leads to alcohol abuse or intoxication. It changes from person to person. Furthermore, not all 
alcohol abuse leads to adverse economic outcomes. For instance, a person may get intoxicated 
due to excessive alcohol consumption in the evening, and wake up the next day a sober 
individual and move on with his life without being affected by the incidence of intoxication the 
night before. For the purposes of this dissertation, this particular example does not qualify for 
being an example of alcohol abuse.  In order for an excessive drinking incidence to be qualified 
as an example of alcohol abuse for the purposes of this dissertation, it should lead to an outcome 
which generates an economic burden.
1
  Some examples of relevant incidences of alcohol abuse 
for the purposes of this dissertation are: an excessive alcohol consumption induced workplace 
accident affecting productivity, alcohol intoxication related missing workdays, and alcohol 
intoxication induced crime incidents.  
                                                            
1 For the purposes of simplicity, the term economic burden also includes a criminal incidence. 
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 Given that the relevant definition of alcohol abuse is provided, this dissertation attempts 
to answer the following three specific research questions in three different essays:  
 (1) How does alcohol abuse affect income growth in the United States? 
 (2) How does alcohol abuse affect income growth at the international level? 
 (3) How does alcohol abuse affect crime in the United States? 
 One of the determinants of the extent of an empirical research project is the availability 
of data.  As it will be further discussed, availability of panel data is one of the major 
determinants of the extent of this dissertation in particular.  Panel data are available for state 
level crime in the U.S. in addition state level income growth in the U.S. and country level 
income growth data internationally.  Therefore, this dissertation attempts to answer two different 
research questions by using three available data sets.   
Contribution of the Dissertation to the Literature 
 Major contributions of this dissertation to the literature are in at least three dimensions: 
(1) This dissertation documents the negative relationship between alcohol abuse and income 
growth; (2) This dissertation documents the positive relationship between alcohol abuse and 
crime; (3) This dissertation provides indirect evidence on the effectiveness of excise alcohol 
taxes and alcohol control policies.  
Identification of Alcohol Abuse 
 The key factor to the validity of this dissertation and meaningfulness of the estimated 
empirical results is the identification of alcohol abuse. Ideally, availability of a perfect measure 
of ―per capita alcohol abuse‖ would empower a researcher in investigating the causal 
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relationship between alcohol abuse and a variety of outcomes including aggregate income 
growth and crime.  The percentage of people who drink excessively or a measure of per capita 
excessive drinking rate (or frequency) would be examples of (close to) ideal measures of alcohol 
abuse.  However, such measures are not available for long enough time periods to conduct 
aggregate level analysis in addition to suffering from serious degrees of measurement error bias.
2
  
Even though an ideal measure is not available, a vast literature suggests a second best measure of 
alcohol abuse at the aggregate level.  As is discussed in depth in the first essay of this 
dissertation, changes in per capita alcohol consumption in general and changes in per capita beer 
consumption in particular are the best available measures of changes in alcohol abuse for 
conducting aggregate level analysis for the purposes of this dissertation.
3
  Per capita beer 
consumption is used as the measure of alcohol abuse for the United States since evidence based 
on various disciplines supports the view that per capita beer consumption is the best available 
aggregate measure of alcohol abuse in the United States.  Since there is no uniform evidence 
with respect to a particular measure of per capita alcoholic drink‘s representativeness of alcohol 
abuse,  not only per capita beer consumption, but also per capita wine consumption, per capita 
liquor consumption, and per capita ethanol consumption are used as measures of alcohol abuse in 
Essay II of this dissertation.  Nevertheless, evidence from the Essay II of this dissertation 
suggests that per capita beer consumption is the most appropriate aggregate measure of alcohol 
abuse not only in the United States, but around the globe.  
                                                            
2 A more thorough explanation with respect to the availability of such measures is presented in the first essay of the 
dissertation. 
3 A vast literature with respect to the credibility of per capita alcohol consumption as a proxy of alcohol abuse is 
presented in the second chapter.  
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 The power of the representativeness of per capita beer consumption relies on three 
factors: (1) Availability of panel data. Without having panel data, representativeness of per 
capita beer consumption as a measure of alcohol abuse would be very limited since the necessary 
variation to conduct such an analysis comes from the changes in per capita beer consumption 
over time; (2) Prevalence of alcohol consumption in the population is relatively stable in short 
periods of time. Therefore changes in per capita beer consumption can represent changes in the 
alcohol consumption intensity of drinking population; (3) Pareto Law of Consumption. 
According to the Pareto law of consumption, 20 percent of the consumers consume a good 80 
percent of total consumption of a product. Indeed, alcohol consumption complies with the Pareto 
law of consumption very well (i.e., it follows a log normal distribution) (Cook, 2007). As a 
result, any given level of increase in per capita beer consumption results in a higher increase in 
consumption of heavy drinkers.  This fact suggests that changes in per capita beer consumption 
reflect the changes in alcohol abuse well.  
Essays 
 This dissertation is composed of three essays which conduct empirical analysis. Essay I 
examines the effect of alcohol abuse on income growth in the United States by using state level 
data. Essay II examines the effect of alcohol abuse on income growth by employing international 
data. Essay III investigates the impact of alcohol abuse on crime rates in the United States by 
employing state level data.  
The next chapter of the dissertation continues with Essay I: “The Aggregate Spillover 
Effects of Alcohol: The Impact of Alcohol Abuse on State Level Income Growth.‖ Chapter III 
6 
 
presents Essay II: “Alcohol Abuse and Income Growth: A Cross Country Investigation.‖ Chapter 
IV presents Essay III: ―Alcohol Abuse and Crime: A State Level Investigation.‖  
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Chapter 2: Essay I 
  The Aggregate Spillover Effects of Alcohol: The Impact of Alcohol Abuse on State Level 
Income Growth 
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I. Introduction 
 
Alcohol abuse not only affects an individual‘s long term health outcomes, but also his 
immediate behavior.  Alcohol abuse in particular has severe socioeconomic consequences: lost 
productivity, disability, early death, crime, neglect of family responsibilities, personality 
deterioration, and other problems.
4
  Therefore, not surprisingly, alcohol is the most extensively 
researched commodity of all kinds.
5
  
Even though the effects of alcohol consumption and abuse have been examined at the 
individual level in different fields, including medicine, economics, public health, criminology, 
and sociology, not much has been done on the aggregate level regarding the economic impact of 
alcohol consumption.  
On the one hand, researchers who have done extensive research on the impact of alcohol 
consumption and abuse on various outcomes, such as public health, economics, and crime, claim 
that the overall costs outweigh the benefits.  As Cook and Moore (2002) state, ―The production 
and sale of alcoholic beverages account for a small share of national product in the United States 
and in other advanced economies.  However, the deleterious effects of alcohol consumption on 
health and safety constitute a substantial economic burden, reducing our overall standard of 
living.‖  In addition, Irving Fisher (1926), who was one of the biggest proponents of Prohibition, 
made an early effort to assess the impact of drinking on overall productivity. Based on an 
                                                            
4 Evidence and related literature will be presented in the remaining parts of this paper.  
5 A simple (scholar.google.com) search for the word ‗alcohol‘ gives almost 5.5 million results while the same search 
for ‗sugar‘, whose effects are extensively examined in medical field and other fields, gives 2.25 million results in 
comparison.  Similar searches for commodities such as corn, beef, meat gives fewer results than that of alcohol. 
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experiment with respect to the impact of drinking on productivity, he predicted that prohibition 
would lead to a 5% increase in national productivity.
6
 
On the other hand, Beer Serves America, which is sponsored by the Beer Institute and 
National Beer Wholesalers Association (NBWA), representing America‘s leading brewers and 
beer distributors, claims that the beer industry contributes to the U.S. economy through wages 
and taxes.  In addition, they claim that the beer industry contributes to economic growth through 
the expansions of the industry.  
This paper attempts to contribute to economic literature by doing the following: First, 
uncovering the effects of excessive alcohol consumption, which are alcohol abuse, alcohol 
intoxication, and alcohol dependence, on state level per capita personal income growth.  Second, 
testing the validity of the NBWA‘s claim of beer industry‘s contribution to U.S. economic 
growth.  Third, providing an explanation for how the increases in alcohol excise taxes, which is 
supported by a large number of scholars, would affect the overall economy in a general 
equilibrium framework.  
Even though there are a few studies examining the impact of macroeconomic conditions 
on drinking prevalence and patterns, such as those by Ruhm and Black (2002) and Ruhm (1995), 
there is no established literature on the research question this study is trying to address.  
The following methodology is undertaken to uncover the effect of alcohol abuse on state 
level per capita personal income growth.  First, the author refers to a broad spectrum of 
literature, examining the effects of alcohol consumption and abuse on a variety of outcomes, to 
identify the channels through which alcohol abuse can affect economic productivity (i.e., the 
impact of excess drinking on various productivity outcomes at the micro level). Second, by 
                                                            
6 In the experiment, two or four typesetters were given drinks for four days, while the other two were used as a 
control group.  They found that drinking three beers a day reduced typesetting output by about 10 percent. 
10 
 
consulting the literature with respect to alcohol consumption and abuse in various fields (i.e., 
public health, crime, economics, and other related fields), the author tries to identify a measure 
of alcohol abuse at the aggregate level.  Third, once the per capita beer consumption is identified 
as the most plausible measure of alcohol abuse at the aggregate level in the United States, the 
author tries to address the potential endogeneity between per capita personal income growth and 
per capita beer consumption by utilizing state level excise alcohol taxes.  Fourth, potential 
shortcomings of the mentioned methodology and the likely bias stemming from them are 
discussed.  Finally, the author estimates a reduced form model of per capita personal income 
growth on per capita beer consumption (which is the measure of alcohol abuse) to unearth the 
aggregate effect of alcohol abuse on income growth. 
By utilizing the state level per capita beer consumption as a measure of alcohol abuse, 
even though generally small, this study finds a negative statistically significant relationship 
between per capita beer consumption and income growth once the endogeneity between income 
growth and per capita beer consumption is controlled for using excise alcohol taxes.  These 
results favor the view that an increase in excise alcohol taxes, which is suggested by many 
scholars, would not be inefficient in terms of per capita personal income growth.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section reviews a broad range of literature to 
discuss the various channels through which alcohol abuse and consumption may affect worker 
productivity, and national savings, which eventually can have an impact on economic growth.  
Section 3 lays out the theoretical framework based on the evidence provided in Section 2.  
Section 4 reviews the relevant literature to identify an aggregate level measure of alcohol abuse.  
Section 5 discusses the empirical methodology and how I deal with the endogenous nature of per 
capita beer consumption, which is identified as the best measure of alcohol abuse in the previous 
11 
 
section, to income growth.  Section 7 presents the results.  Section 8 discusses policy 
implications of the results.  
II. Micro Channels 
 Alcohol abuse is defined as follows by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC):  
“A person can abuse alcohol without actually being an alcoholic--that is, he or she may drink too much 
and too often but still not be dependent on alcohol. Some of the problems linked to alcohol abuse include 
not being able to meet work, school, or family responsibilities; drunk-driving arrests and car crashes; 
and drinking-related medical conditions. Under some circumstances, even social or moderate drinking is 
dangerous--for example, when driving, during pregnancy, or when taking certain medications.” 7 
 Therefore, for the purposes of this study, any alcohol consumption leading to outcomes 
that have negative economic consequences is considered as alcohol abuse for the purposes of this 
paper. 
 It is well documented in the economics literature that labor productivity, changes in 
population, human capital accumulation, and physical capital accumulation are among the 
determinants of economic growth.
8
  Therefore, alcohol abuse can effect economic growth 
through its effect on the determinants of economic growth listed above.  Therefore, this section 
reviews an extensive literature to identify the channels through which alcohol abuse can affect 
labor productivity and national savings.  
 In order for a factor to have an impact at the macroeconomic level, it should be based on 
a microeconomic level relationship.  Such relationships are best identified through micro level 
studies.  For example, since education (on average) improves worker productivity, it is an 
interesting research question to examine the impact of education on income growth at the 
                                                            
7 Retrieved May 20, 2009 from http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/FAQs/General-English/. 
8 A host of other factors can be listed as the determinants of economic growth.  For the sake of providing a clear 
argument, I restrict the discussion to the factors which are relevant to my argument.  
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aggregate level.  Likewise, in order to claim a relationship between alcohol abuse and economic 
growth, one needs to show the effect of alcohol abuse on various growth related microeconomic 
outcomes so that a possible relationship between the two at the aggregate level can be attributed 
to a theoretical foundation.  The nature of the phenomenon does not always allow micro level 
studies to be conducted.  For instance, one of the best ways to identify the impact of alcohol 
abuse on labor productivity is to conduct controlled experiments by choosing a random group of 
workers and dictating them to consume excessive amounts of alcohol so that analyzing their 
outcomes would allow us to establish a theoretical relationship between alcohol abuse and 
economic growth through worker productivity.  When the subjects are human beings, ethical 
concerns do not allow one to undertake such experiments.  Hence, not all the evidence presented 
here is based on micro level studies. Therefore, when it is relevant, studies using aggregate data 
sets are used as a reference.  
Alcohol abuse may affect economic growth through various channels.  Some of them are 
classified as follows: lost workdays and lost productivity at work, morbidity, mortality, and the 
impact through reductions in national savings (or financial externalities).
9
  I will continue with 
the discussion of how each of these factors can affect microeconomic channels of economic 
growth. 
II.I. Lost Workdays and Labor Productivity at Work 
 It is trivial that, given the number of workers a country has, increases in hours worked 
has a positive impact on production.  A lost workday should likewise have a negative impact on 
production.  In other words, a lost workday is a direct shock to the labor supply of a worker.  
Alcohol abuse related lost workdays can be resulted from sickness absence, driving under the 
                                                            
9 The nature of this analysis requires one to discuss the overlapping effects of different factors.  Hence, in order to 
avoid being repetitive, not all the aspects of underlying factors are discussed under each heading.  
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influence (DUI) arrests, alcohol related injury work leaves, being involved in alcohol abuse 
induced criminal activity, and of course the alcohol dependence related withdrawals from the 
labor force.  
Lost Workdays  
Absence at work has a direct impact on the supply of labor and hence on overall 
economic productivity.  It makes sense that alcohol abuse may lead to sickness absence at work 
since it has an immediate impact on various health related outcomes.  Several studies have found 
a positive relationship between alcohol use and reduced workplace performance measured 
through absenteeism, poor relations with co-workers, and accidents.  Johansson et al. (2009), 
using regional level panel data from Finland for the period of 1993-2005, find that per capita 
alcohol consumption is positively associated with sickness absence, particularly for men.  By 
using aggregate time series data from Sweden for the period of 1935-2002, Norström (2006) 
argues that a one liter increase in per-capita alcohol consumption
10
 results in a 13% increase in 
sickness absence among men while the relationship is not statistically significant for women.  
French and Zarkin (1995), who use data on 1000 workers from four different worksites, find that 
both overall drinking and frequency of abuse are positively related to absenteeism.  Their 
findings on the relationship between alcohol use and absenteeism are parallel to the findings of 
some other studies (Rosenbaum et al., 1992; Lehman and Simpson, 1992). 
Driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs is the act of operating a motor 
vehicle after having consumed alcohol to the degree that mental and motor skills are impaired.  It 
is a crime which is subject to arrest in all states in the U.S.  Although DUI laws encompass other 
                                                            
10 The relationship between per capita alcohol consumption and alcohol abuse is well documented.  In order to avoid 
being repetitive I defer the discussion on the relationship between per capita alcohol consumption measures and 
alcohol abuse to Section 4.  
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types of substance abuse, excess alcohol consumption is the major cause behind DUI arrests.  It 
is trivial that alcohol abuse is the major cause of DUI arrests, and the expected impact of alcohol 
related DUI arrest on lost workdays is positive.
11
  
The expected impact of alcohol abuse related absence on lost workdays is positive.  
Therefore, alcohol related absence is expected to have a negative impact on per capita personal 
income growth.  
Lost Productivity at Work  
 Alcohol abuse hinders productivity at work.  Even though we lack the experimental 
evidence on the direct effect of alcoholism and alcohol abuse on labor productivity, various 
survey based studies point to the fact that overindulgence in alcohol impedes productivity at 
work.  Studies reviewing the literature show that in general problem drinking causes a decline in 
earnings which can be as high as 20% (Harwood et al., 1984; Rice et al., 1990).  Kenkel and 
Wang (1998) compare the job attributes of alcoholic and non-alcoholic men by using data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  Their results show that without controlling 
for occupational status, alcoholics are estimated to earn 9.8% less than non-alcoholics do.  
Nevertheless, when non-wage components of workers compensation, fringe benefits, are 
considered, the estimated loss of an alcoholic is about 20% in terms of fringe benefits.  
Additionally, they find that alcoholics are less likely to be in white-collar jobs and conditional on 
being in a blue-collar occupation, alcoholics earn 15% less than their non-alcoholic colleagues.  
Apparently, possibility of reverse causality, potential worker frustration leading to excessive 
alcohol intake, should be taken into consideration when evaluating this kind of literature.    
                                                            
11  One can mistakenly claim that repealing DUI arrest laws would have a positive impact on lost workdays and 
hence positively affect economic growth.  This would be a very naïve approach since abandoning DUI arrest laws 
would provide incentives to drive while intoxicated and hence cause an increase in car accidents, which would 
create other costs and negative externalities in an economy.   
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 Blum et al. (1993) examine the relationship between alcohol use and job performance 
measures for a sample of 136 employed men, including both self-reports and reports of 
workplace collaterals.  They conclude that heavy drinkers were seen by others as having lower 
technical achievement, lower self-direction, weaker interpersonal relations, and lower degrees of 
conflict avoidance.  
 There are also surveys asking the respondents whether they suffered from the negative 
consequences of drinking.  According to Hilton and Clark (1987), 2.9 % of men in the U.S. 
stated that drinking harmed their employment opportunities while 0.8% stated that they had 
either lost or nearly lost a job as a result of their drinking.  Such percentages for women, on the 
other hand, were about half of that for men.  
 Despite the fact that heavy drinking lowers productivity at work, the studies examining 
the impact of moderate drinking on wages find a positive relationship between the two.  In other 
words, moderate drinkers on average make more than abstainers and heavy drinkers.
12
  
Berger and Leigh (1988) were the first to identify the positive association between 
alcohol consumption and wages.  They find that the premium for male drinkers is 10% while it is 
35% percent for the female drinkers.  Bray (2005) examines the effect of alcohol consumption on 
wage determination.  Although generally insignificant, his results suggest that moderate alcohol 
use while in school or working has a positive effect on the returns to education or experience and 
hence to human capital accumulation.  Therefore he concludes that alcohol use does not appear 
to adversely affect returns to education or work experience and therefore has no negative effect 
on the efficiency of education or experience in forming human capital.  Hamilton and Hamilton 
                                                            
12 Even though alcohol abuse is at the center of this study, as will be discussed in Section 4, because per capita beer 
consumption is the best available measure of alcohol consumption at the aggregate level, potential positive effects of 
moderate alcohol consumption should be discussed since it is possible that per capita beer consumption is likely to 
be correlated with moderate alcohol consumption as well.  
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(1997) show that moderate alcohol consumption leads to increased earnings relative to 
abstention.  On the other hand, heavy drinking leads to reduced earnings.  Moreover, heavy 
drinkers possess flatter age-earnings profiles and attain lower returns for higher education than 
non-drinkers and moderate drinkers.  Tekin (2004) finds in a Russian sample that alcohol 
consumption has an inverse-U shaped impact on employment and wages for females and the 
impact on males appears to be positive but the inverse-U shape is less pronounced.  However, 
once unobserved individual heterogeneity is accounted for using fixed effects, alcohol 
consumption is found to have no significant effect on either males or females.  The fixed effect 
wage models indicate that alcohol consumption has a small, positive, but linear impact on the 
wage rate for both males and females.  Likewise, French and Zarkin (1995) find an inverse-U 
shaped relationship between earnings and drinking.  Using a set of instrumental variables, 
McDonald and Shields (2001) find positive and significant returns to moderate drinking for male 
and female employees which drop off rapidly as consumption increases.  
However, the evidence is not conclusive for two reasons.  First, the causal link between 
moderate drinking and productivity has not been successfully identified.  Second, there are some 
studies claiming that the moderate drinker bonus is just a myth. 
Peters (2004), using a panel of NLSY data, shows that the OLS estimate of wages on 
drinking produces biased results.  When individual specific effects are controlled for, the 
coefficients are rendered statistically insignificant.  Cook and Peters (2005) show that the 
drinker‘s bonus is just a myth.  They demonstrate some evidence of a positive association 
between alcohol prices, proxied by an index of excise taxes, and wages of full time workers.  
They find strong evidence that the prevalence of full time work increases with alcohol prices - 
suggesting that a reduction in drinking increases labor supply.  They also demonstrate some 
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positive association between alcohol prices and the earnings of a full-time worker, and conclude 
that the positive relationship between drinking and earnings is the result of the fact that alcohol is 
a normal good, for which consumption increases with income, rather than alcohol consumption 
enhancing productivity.   
 These findings cast strong doubts on the impact of moderate drinking on earnings.  
Furthermore, studies finding positive associations between moderate drinking and earnings do 
not make strong references to increased productivity as a result of alcohol intake.  Instead, they 
stress the possibility that drinking facilitates social networking, which in turn generates improved 
job options based on the assumption that most people find jobs through word of mouth which is 
facilitated by the presence of a wide network of friends.  Hence, alcohol consumption induced 
social networking may not affect aggregate productivity even though it may potentially affect a 
person‘s income.  In addition, it is very likely that the causality would be in the opposite 
direction.  People may increase their alcohol consumption in response to increases in their 
earnings.  Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence supporting the view that alcohol is a normal 
commodity whose demand increases with income (Ruhm and Black, 2002; Ruhm, 1995; Cook 
and Tauchen, 1982). 
 The evidence on the impact of alcohol abuse on productivity suggests that alcohol abuse 
is likely to have a negative impact on productivity at the workplace.  Studies analyzing moderate 
drinking, however, suggest that the impact of moderate drinking on productivity is ambiguous.  
Therefore, alcohol abuse related lost productivity at work would affect growth rates negatively.  
Taking the recent studies into consideration, it could be expected that the impact of moderate 
alcohol consumption gained productivity at work should be close to zero.  
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II.II. Morbidity and Mortality 
 The impact of alcohol consumption and abuse on injury and death is well documented.  
Studies in different disciplines confirm each other.  Drinking is involved in about two thirds of 
all injury deaths, the victim or other involved party has been drinking enough to be intoxicated 
by the usual standard (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004b; Smith, Branas, & 
Miller, 1999).  According to Hingson and Winter (2003) in 41% of fatal crashes in 2002, there 
was a driver or a pedestrian who had at least one drink, and 35% involved a blood alcohol 
content (BAC)
13
 greater than the legal limit of 0.08 percent.  Drivers with alcohol in their blood 
are seven times more likely to cause a fatal crash; legally drunk drivers pose a risk 13 times 
greater than sober drivers (Levitt and Porter, 2001).  Traynor (2005) shows that alcohol use on 
average increases crash severity.  Low and moderate levels of drinking could stimulate car 
accidents as well.  Even moderate amount of alcohol intake can increase the average response 
time to hazards (2.5 s in no alcohol condition compared with 3.2 s in moderate alcohol condition) 
(West et al., 1993).  
 Alcohol is one of leading causes of disease burden in the world.  Murray and Lopez 
(1996) estimate alcohol to be responsible for 1.5% of all deaths and 3.5% of the total burden of 
disease in disability adjusted life years.  Alcohol taxes have a negative effect on the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases.  By using state level data from the U.S., Chesson et al. (2000) find 
that a ―$1 increase in the per-gallon liquor tax reduces gonorrhea rates by 2.1 percent, and a beer 
tax increase of $0.20 per six-pack reduces gonorrhea rates by 8.9 percent, with similar though 
                                                            
13 Blood alcohol content or blood alcohol concentration (abbreviated BAC) is the concentration of alcohol in a 
person‘s blood.  BAC is most commonly used as a metric of intoxication for legal or medical purposes.  It is usually 
measured in terms of mass per volume, but can also be measured in terms of mass per mass.  Blood alcohol 
concentration is given in many different units and notations, but they are all relatively synonymous with each other 
numerically. 
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more pronounced effects on syphilis rates.‖  Higher beer taxes are associated with lower rates of 
gonorrhea for males and are suggestive of lower AIDS rates (Markowitz et al., 2004).   
 Morbidity reduces the returns to human capital and lowers labor productivity.  
Furthermore, injuries cause an increase in lost workdays.  Injury related spending shifts the funds 
from productive investments to injury treatment and related rebuilding costs.  A car accident or a 
work related injury may require replacement costs for the equipment, such as repairing or 
replacement of the car or the machinery.  Furthermore, a high prevalence of DUI alcohol abuse 
may force various levels of governments to undertake strict preventive efforts.  For instance, a 
higher number of police officers and related equipment, such as police cars, computers, 
telecommunication devices, jail and prison space, may be needed.  As a result, public funds have 
to be shifted from productive investments, such as additions to physical capital stock, to cover 
the costs originated from excess alcohol use.  Therefore, I expect a negative impact of morbidity 
on per capita personal income growth through lost workdays and the reallocation of savings from 
productive uses to injury prevention and damage replacement spending.  
 Even though the majority of studies focus on the negative effects alcohol has on health 
outcomes, there are also studies which focus on the positive aspects of alcohol consumption.  
Hoffmeister et al. (1999) find that light (and possibly moderate) alcohol consumption reduces the 
risk of cardiovascular disease and total mortality risk and is favorably related to HDL-
cholesterol.  There are other studies verifying the beneficial effect of alcohol consumption on 
cardiovascular health (i.e. Gronbaek, 2001; Rehm, et al. 2003; Klatsky, 2002; Thun, et al. 1997).  
Most macroeconomic studies examining the impact of health on economic growth makes 
their analysis through the impact of longevity.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) use predicted 
mortality as an instrument to find the impact of life expectancy on economic growth.  They find 
20 
 
that a one percent increase in life expectancy leads to a 1.7-2 percent increase in population and a 
small positive effect of life expectancy on total GDP over the first 40 years, which somewhat 
grows over the next 20 years, but not enough to compensate for the increase in population.  
Overall, the increases in life expectancy (and the associated increases in population) appear to 
have reduced income per capita (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007).  On the other hand, some 
studies find a positive impact of mortality decline on economic growth.  Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, 
and Weil (2000) and Kalemli Ozcan (2002) find a positive impact of increases in life expectancy 
to economic growth in the long run since longevity increases the investment in human capital 
through education, while fertility decreases as a response to longevity increases.  Thus, in the 
long run life expectancy has a positive impact on economic growth.  A more recent study by 
Ashraf et al. (2008) finds that the impact of positive health shocks on income growth depends on 
which part of population is most affected by the disease.  For example, in the short run, 
eradicating tuberculosis raises income per capita whereas eradicating malaria lowers it.  The 
different effects on income of eradicating these diseases arise largely because tuberculosis strikes 
mostly prime-aged workers, while malaria affects mainly young children (Ashraf et al., 2008).  
 When it comes to evaluating the impact of mortality on economic growth, one should be 
very careful to distinguish between how it affects economic growth through two different 
channels which can oppose each other.  A person‘s death decreases population which has a 
positive impact on per capita personal income whereas loss of his productivity has a negative 
impact on per capita personal income.  The aggregate impact depends on the magnitude of these 
opposing factors.  Death of a prime aged worker and baby do not have the same impact on per 
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capita income growth.
14
  A prime aged worker has a much higher marginal productivity in 
comparison to a baby, which simply has zero productivity.  Hence, while both deaths would have 
a positive effect on per capita personal income through a decrease in population, the expected 
effect through productivity would differ for the two–that is, the impact of the prime aged person 
would be negative while it would be positive for the baby.  
Based on the discussion above, the impact of alcohol related death on per capita personal 
income is ambiguous.  Abuse leads to death mostly through accidents while moderate drinking 
enhances cardiovascular health and longevity.  Hence, the immediate impact of these two factors 
on mortality should have balancing effects on per capita income growth, though the magnitudes 
are not clear.  Since the relevance of both alcohol consumption and abuse and related death is 
particularly among the prime aged population, the aggregate impact on economic growth would 
be either zero or negative assuming that the impact of alcohol related mortality on per capita 
income is somewhat balanced by enhanced longevity.  
II.III. Reductions in National Savings 
 Alcohol abuse affects national savings through various channels.  Even though it is 
possible that a person can shift his personal funds from savings to consumption, the reduction in 
savings discussed here are not necessarily focused on the changes in individual savings behavior.  
Alcohol consumption and abuse related accidents, injuries, and health outcomes cause the funds 
to shift from savings to restoration spending.  Various studies in different countries find that 
alcohol abuse is costly to societies.   
                                                            
14 The morality of this argument can be questioned. However, the nature of our analysis forces us to discuss every 
aspect of subject matter.  Gruber (2005) and others have discussed the possible welfare benefits that can arise due to 
early deaths through lowering Social Security and Medicare payments. 
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According to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000 report, the economic 
cost of alcohol abuse in the U.S. for 1992 is about $148 billion.  This report makes its 
calculations based on medical expenses, lost present and future earnings due to alcohol related 
illness, death and crime, and costs of crashes, fires, and criminal justice expenses.  Alcohol-
related hospital charges in 1998 in New Mexico, U.S., were US$51 million in comparison to 
US$35 million collected as alcohol taxes, clearly showing that communities spend more money 
on taking care of alcohol problems than they earn from alcohol.  In Canada, the economic costs 
of alcohol amount to approximately US$18.4 billion, representing 2.7 percent of the gross 
domestic product.  Studies in other countries have estimated the cost of alcohol-related problems 
to be around one percent of the gross domestic product (Collins and Lapsely, 1996; Rice et al., 
1990).  Alcohol related externalities also impose large costs to the economies in the European 
Union.  Total tangible costs of alcohol were estimated to be €125 billion in the EU in 2003.  
These costs are those associated with the criminal justice system, health care, and lost workdays.  
This amount equals to 1.3 percent of GDP of EU and total of excise alcohol taxes are only one 
fourth of it.  They estimate intangible costs more than twice the tangible costs.  Barker (2002) 
finds that in New Zealand in 1999 alcohol excise taxes only account for the half of alcohol 
related direct costs.  Weisner (2001), using data from heterogeneous California county with a 
population of 900,000, finds that those who report ‗problem drinking‘ have the following 
statistical characteristics: 41 percent were seen by the criminal justice system, 8.0 percent by the 
social welfare system, 42.1 percent by the general health system, which are primary health 
clinics and emergency rooms, 3.1 percent by the public mental health system, and 5.9 percent by 
public alcohol or drug treatment agencies.  
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For the reasons mentioned, various studies advocate that increases in alcohol excise taxes 
would produce favorable outcomes, particularly through reducing the negative externalities 
associated with alcohol consumption.  Manning et al. (1989) show that alcohol excise taxes 
cover only about half the costs imposed to others.  According to a discussion paper by Parry et 
al. (2006), the optimal excise taxes in the U.S. should be three to ten times more than the current 
levels.  
These studies do not directly measure the impact of alcohol consumption and abuse on 
national savings rates.  However, their findings strongly hint that alcohol abuse shifts funds from 
savings to the funding of the costs generated by alcohol-related outcomes.  Hence, I expect that 
increases in alcohol abuse have a negative impact on national savings rates. Reduced savings 
rates affect economic growth negatively through investment and physical capital accumulation. 
III. Theoretical Framework 
 In Section 2 the evidence for how alcohol abuse can affect the microeconomic growth 
factors was presented. Based on the discussion in Section 2 the following summary could be 
made with respect to the impact of alcohol abuse and consumption on income growth:  
(i) Alcohol related lost workdays: expected impact on economic growth is negative. 
(ii) Alcohol related lost productivity at work: expected impact on economic growth is negative. 
(iii) Alcohol related productivity gain at work: expected impact is either zero or positive (i.e., the 
evidence is not conclusive).
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(iv) Alcohol related morbidity: expected impact on economic growth is negative. 
(v) Alcohol related mortality: expected impact on economic growth is ambiguous. 
                                                            
15 Apparently, alcohol consumption related productivity gains are not based on alcohol abuse. Even though the effect 
of alcohol abuse on income growth is in the center of this paper, because utilized measure of alcohol abuse (per 
capita beer consumption) can also be related to moderate alcohol consumption, potential positive effects of moderate 
alcohol consumption is also taken into consideration. 
24 
 
(vi) Alcohol related reductions in National Savings: expected impact on economic growth is 
negative.  
 Therefore, the theoretical relationship this dissertation trying to investigate can be 
summarized as follows: 
 alcohol abuse and consumption microeconomic growthchannels income growth   
 Based on the literature discussed above, the expected impact of alcohol abuse on income 
growth is therefore negative. The next section continues with quantification of alcohol abuse.   
IV. Identifying Alcohol Abuse at the Aggregate Level 
 Evidence from individual level studies from a variety of different disciplines supports the 
view that alcohol abuse and only hinders the productivity of a worker but also shifts the funds 
from productive uses—that is, investments to increase physical capital stock and improve 
technology—to unproductive uses as discussed above.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
alcohol abuse affects per capita personal income growth negatively.  The challenge of this study 
is to quantify alcohol abuse in an appropriate manner in order to be able to estimate its impact on 
aggregate outcomes.  Thus, in order to proceed with the empirical analysis I need to have a 
proper measure to identify alcohol abuse at the aggregate level.  
In an ideal world, complete information about the level of alcohol abuse of each 
individual in a society would help in quantifying the excess alcohol use at the macroeconomic 
level.  Survey data on alcohol abuse can be one of the ways to quantify such measures.  Indeed, 
prevalence of alcohol abuse in the whole population would be a good measure.  Since it is very 
common to use per capita measures in growth estimations, a measure of per capita alcohol abuse 
would be an ideal fit.  However, survey based data on alcohol consumption is particularly  
problematic regarding the measures of alcohol abuse, since the quality of the data is limited by 
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the respondent‘s willingness and ability to report just much they drink (Cook 2007).  A great 
deal of stigma exists in revealing alcohol abuse in surveys.  Hence, survey data with respect to 
alcohol abuse is like to suffer from a serious measurement error.  Midanik (1982) shows that 
when tax data on sales are used as the standard, the survey-based estimates of national 
consumption only capture 40% to 60% of actual consumption in the 1970s.  This phenomenon 
persists in recent surveys as well.  The National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related 
Conditions (NESARC), which is conducted by National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism (NIAAA) for period 2001-2002, confirms the results of Midalnik (1982).  Per capita 
self-reported ethanol consumption in the last twelve months for people 18 years and older 
averaged 141.3 ounces. According to NIAAA reports, per-capita alcohol sales in 2000 were 
277.6 ounces consumed by people who are age fifteen and older. The disparity between the two 
measures is great. Based on these reports the underreporting is almost about 50 percent.
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Besides, self-reported survey data on alcohol abuse is not available at the state level in a 
longitudinal form for a long period of time. Even if the survey based alcohol abuse data were 
available, estimations based on such data should have been interpreted with caution for the 
reasons discussed above.  
Since we do not live in an ideal world (for data purposes), other forms of data which 
could be suitable for this analysis is considered. Indeed, sales based apparent per-capita alcohol 
consumption data are the most reliable data that reflect excess alcohol use.  Per capita tax-paid 
sales provide fairly accurate trends and interstate patterns in per capita ethanol consumption 
(Cook, 2007).  Different studies conducted in different times and locations confirm the 
                                                            
16 The claim that the age group between fifteen and seventeen years of age is responsible for the disparity between 
the two measures is obviously not a valid one as it is unlikely that the mentioned age group can be responsible for 
such a big disparity between self reported data and per-capita alcohol sales.  
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relationship between per capita alcohol consumption measures and drinking patterns. Alcohol 
consumption among different groups does not follow a uniform distribution - that is, 
consumption among individuals differs tremendously.  
A well-known rule of thumb in marketing science, known as the Pareto Law or the Law 
of Heavy Half or the 80-20 Rule, is that the top 20 percent of buyers for most any consumer 
product account for fully 80 percent of the sales.  Alcoholic beverages are no exception. The 
heaviest drinkers account for the bulk of ethanol consumption.  The distribution is highly skewed 
to the right, with the median less than the mean; in other words, most drinkers consume less than 
the per capita average (Cook, 2007).  Hence, a log-normal distribution provides a fairly good fit 
for the distribution of alcohol consumption among drinkers.  According to Edwards et al. (1994), 
the consumption associated with each quintile tends to change in the same direction with per-
capita alcohol by drinkers; thus, the prevalence of heavy drinking changes faster than the 
prevalence of per-capita alcohol consumption does (Skog, 1985; Bruun. et al., 1975).  Thus, if 
one group has twice the average consumption of another, it would be expected to have four times 
the prevalence of heavy drinking.  And the 20 percent decline in average consumption in the 
United States in the 1980s and 1990s implies a 36 percent decline in the prevalence of heavy 
drinking (Cook 2007).  Based on NESARC data, Cook (2007) presents that for both men and 
women, and for each age group, the likelihoods of drinking and of bingeing increase with state 
per capita consumption, as does the amount drinkers choose to drink.  Hence, per capita alcohol 
consumption is the best available measure of alcohol abuse at the aggregate level. 
Furthermore, in different parts of the world different beverage types are used as a means 
to alcohol abuse. Greenfield and Rogers (1999), find that it is not hard liquor but beer which is 
consumed most by heaviest drinkers. And hazardous beer consumption is more predictive of 
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alcohol-related problems than hazardous consumption of wine or spirits. Berger and Snortum 
(1985), by summarizing the related literature, show that beer is the drink preferred by most of the 
drinkers and those who prefer beer are more likely to drive while intoxicated than those who 
prefer wine or distilled spirits.   They also conclude that beer is disproportionately preferred by 
higher risk groups, which are men versus women, youths versus the elderly and heavy drinkers 
versus moderate drinkers. Therefore, per capita beer consumption is in the center attention of this 
study.  
There can still be some doubts on the ability of per capita beer consumption measures in 
representing excess alcohol use.  Changes in the prevalence of beer consumption would cast 
doubts on the validity of it as a measure of alcohol abuse.  If the change in per capita alcohol 
consumption results from the change in the prevalence of alcohol consumption in the population, 
the variation in per capita alcohol consumption measures may not reflect the changes in abuse.  
Since prevalence of alcohol consumption is not available for a long enough period at the state 
level, I will have to restrict my analysis to the use of beer capita beer consumption.
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Consequently, this study utilizes per-capita beer consumption as a measure of alcohol abuse 
based on the evidence presented above.  
Even though per capita beer consumption is the best available measure of alcohol, it 
imposes apparent limitations.  Yearly changes in per capita beer consumption can only reflect the 
short term effects of alcohol abuse even though alcohol abuse has long term effects as well.  For 
instance, schooling and human capital formation of children may be negatively affected by their 
                                                            
17 The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) has information on the prevalence of alcohol 
consumption at the state level. BRFSS survey started in 1984 and continues since then.  Nevertheless, the BRFSS 
survey only included 15 states in 1984 and a full participation of all the states did not happen until mid 1990s.  
Furthermore, the data are not available for every year even after all the states are included to the survey.  Hence, 
such data do not provide a long enough panel to use in my analysis.  Even though such data were available, 
problems with respect to self reported alcohol consumption would still exist. 
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parents‘ alcohol abuse. Long run income growth is definitely affected by schooling and human 
capital formation of children. Nevertheless, yearly changes in per capita beer consumption can 
only represent the short term effects of alcohol abuse. Even though this study does not ignore the 
potential negative long term effects of alcohol abuse, it definitely lacks the appropriate means to 
conduct an analysis to extract the long run effects of alcohol abuse.          
V. Data 
Data on yearly state-level per-capita alcohol consumption measures for the period 1970-
1998 come from National Institute on Alcohol Abuse Alcoholism. Per capita beer consumption 
is calculated based on population 14 years and above. Per capita beer consumption reflects the 
per capita pure ethanol taken through the consumption of beer.  Data on state level excise beer 
taxes are taken from the U.S. Brewers Association‘s Brewers‘ Almanac.  Data on state level 
excise liquor and wine taxes are taken from the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States 
(DISCUS).  Excise taxes are the sum of state and federal excise taxes.  Population data are taken 
from the U.S. Census Bureau.  State level per capita personal income data and Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) are taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis website.  Per capita personal income 
growth rates calculated based on per capita personal income data after calculating the real per 
capita personal income by taking inflation into account.  Data on state level economic growth 
and the control variables (state level average total tax rate, average total expenditure rate, and 
state aid from federal government in real per-capita terms) are taken from Tomjlanovich (2004) 
for the period 1970-1998.
18
  Descriptive statistics for the data are provided in Table 2.1. 
 
                                                            
18  The author is grateful to Mark Tomljanovic for very generously sharing his data from 
Tomljanovic (2004). 
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IV. Empirical Methodology 
 In order to deal with the potential endogeneity of right hand side variables, an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach is used in this paper in addition to a state fixed effects 
model.  The following is the general model estimated: 
tststststs ZXY ,,2,1,    
where subscripts s and t refer to state and year, respectively.  State fixed effects, year dummies, 
and an idiosyncratic error term are denoted by  tsts and ,,,  , respectively.  tsY ,  is the yearly 
state level per capita personal income growth.  X refers to variable of interest, state level natural 
log of per capita beer consumption.  Z is the vector of control variables.  Lagged per capita 
personal income controls for the impact of convergence on economic growth.  Additionally, 
controlling for lagged per capita personal income takes into account the impact of income 
differences on alcohol consumption.  Average total public expenditure to gross state product 
controls for the effect of size of government to per capita personal income growth.  Average total 
expenditure rate controls for the impact of government size on economic activity.  Average total 
tax rate controls for the impact of taxes on business activity.  State aid from the federal 
government controls for the impact of state aid to state per capita personal income growth.  
Population captures various state specific trends such as between state migrations.  Furthermore, 
controlling for population also helps to reveal the impact of alcohol abuse related mortality on 
income growth in comparison to not controlling for population.  Percent of population older than 
65 years old and percent of population younger than 17 both control for the changes in labor 
force and the impact of population change on alcohol demand.  These population groups are both 
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drinking less alcohol and supplying fewer labor hours.  Hence, controlling for them takes care of 
both issues.  Now, I will discuss the potential endogenous relationship between alcohol abuse 
(per capita beer consumption) and economic growth. 
Potential Endogeneity of Per Capita Beer Consumption (Alcohol Abuse) to Income Growth  
On the one hand, if people start excessive drinking as a reaction to job loss, during bad 
economic times, i.e., when economic growth slows down or becomes negative, OLS estimates 
would falsely find a negative relationship between economic growth and alcohol consumption 
and abuse.  On the other hand, if people drink more since they have jobs and hence have a higher 
income, then OLS estimates would lead to a false positive relationship between economic growth 
and alcohol abuse.  Moreover, if unobserved factors related to both economic growth and alcohol 
consumption exist, statistical endogeneity may be an issue.  At the aggregate level, all of these 
factors may be a part of the picture.  
Research stressing psychological responses to economic conditions predicts that alcohol 
use will rise during economic downturns as a tool for stress control medication (see, for example, 
Brenner and Mooney, 1983; Winton et al., 1986; Pierce et al., 1994).  Even though per capita 
alcohol consumption would fall during an economic downturn because of an income effect, 
alcohol abuse would go up in contrast.  This fact would cast doubts on OLS results since the 
decreases in per capita alcohol consumption can mask the alcohol abuse generated with the 
influence of an economic downturn.  By using a monthly time series data for the period January 
1955-December 1994, Freeman (2001), finds that overall beer sales are mostly immune to the 
business cycle.  Using BRFSS data from 1984 to 1995, Dee (2001) finds that overall drinking 
and the probability of having 60 or more drinks falls during economic downturns; however, the 
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probability of binge drinking, defined as drinking five or more drinks on a single occasion, 
increases.  Thus, he concludes that the prevalence of binging is countercyclical. 
Nevertheless, there are studies providing very credible counter evidence against this 
view.  Studying the impact of job stress, research in psychology (Baker, 1985; Karasek & 
Theorell, 1990; Fenwick & Tausing, 1994; Sokejima & Kagamimori, 1998) implies that drinking 
may increase with the intensity of employment.  Furthermore, other studies find that alcohol 
consumption is positively related to income (Skog, 1986; Sloan et al., 1995).  Ettner (1997), 
using the 1988 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), shows that non-employment 
significantly reduces both alcohol consumption and dependence symptoms with the exception of 
mixed evidence with respect to involuntary employment.  She finds that job loss increases the 
consumption of alcohol in the overall sample but reduces dependence symptoms among 
individual drinkers.  Ruhm and Black (2002), and Ruhm (1995) find that intake of hard liquor 
declines in bad economic times and this fact leads to a decrease in alcohol abuse as well.  Thus, 
stress-induced drinking during depressed periods might be partially or fully offset by reductions 
due to decreased earnings (Ruhm & Black 2002).  Using individual level data from the BRFSS 
for the period 1987-1999, they find that the decrease in per capita alcohol consumption measures 
in bad economic times are concentrated among heavy consumers while light drinking increases.  
These results suggest that any stress-induced increases in drinking during bad economic times 
are more than offset by declines resulting from changes in economic factors such as lower 
incomes (Ruhm & Black 2002).  
Therefore, in order to deal with the possible endogenous nature of per capita beer 
consumption with income growth, I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach in addition to a 
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state fixed effects specification.  In IV specifications, levels of alcohol excise taxes
19
 (i.e., beer, 
wine, and liquor excise taxes) are used as the instruments.  Next, I follow with a discussion of 
whether excise taxes are suitable instruments for per capita alcohol consumption measures, and 
an overview before estimating the specifications, respectively.  
Are Excise Alcohol Taxes Suitable Instruments? 
 Alcohol demand is determined by various factors including income, wetness of the 
environment, defined as how common and acceptable drinking is in a social surrounding, price 
of alcohol, related regulation, and other factors.  In order for the levels of excise alcohol taxes to 
be suitable IVs for alcohol consumption, the following criteria need to be met: (1) excise taxes 
need to be strong predictors of alcohol abuse, and (2) excise taxes need to be legitimately 
excludable from the economic growth equation.  
(1) Are excise taxes strong predictors of alcohol abuse? 
Controlled experiments provide the best means to identify the causality between any two 
phenomena.  Due to ethical concerns, controlled experiments are not possible to hold with 
human subjects.  Therefore, Sarbaum et al. (1999) conducted an experiment with rats to test how 
drinkers, including heavy drinkers, respond to price changes.  They confirm the law of demand, 
which states a negative relationship between prices and quantities consumed.  They found that a 
100 percent increase in ethanol prices reduces ethanol consumption by marginal amounts 
whereas a 400 percent increase in ethanol prices reduces consumption dramatically.  
 One of the concerns with respect to the validity of alcohol excise taxes arises from the 
fact that alcohol excise taxes make up only a small fraction of the price of alcohol.  Using pooled 
cross sectional time series data on state and Federal alcohol taxes and beverage prices for the 
                                                            
19 ―Excise alcohol taxes‖ and ―levels of excise alcohol taxes‖ are used interchangeably.  
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period 1982-1997, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) find that alcohol taxes are poor 
measures of beverage prices.  Hence, they state that studies using excise taxes as the measure of 
the price of alcohol should be regarded with caution.  However, they also caution that there are a 
number of factors that cause measurement errors in beverage prices.  Hence, Young and 
Bielinska-Kwapisz (2003) estimate alcohol demand by employing pooled data across U.S. states 
for the years 1982-1997.  They find that price elasticity of demand for ranges from (-.53) to  
(-1.24).  They also confirm that the 1991 increase in alcohol excise taxes reduces alcohol 
consumption between 2.5 and 6 percent.  Cook and Moore (1994), by reviewing the literature on 
alcohol related outcomes, conclude that increasing beer taxes would both decrease various social 
costs of alcohol and increase government revenues.  Hence, there is evidence in the literature 
confirming that excise taxes have a negative effect on alcohol demand as well as alcohol abuse.  
However, since the excise taxes comprise only a small fraction of alcohol price in the United 
States, they may not be strong predictors of a change in alcohol abuse even though they predict 
per capita beer sales.  In other words, even though they can predict alcohol abuse to some degree, 
the excise alcohol taxes are weak instruments for predicting alcohol abuse.  In conclusion, even 
though levels of alcohol excise taxes can predict alcohol abuse, their magnitude is questionable.  
In addition to excise alcohol taxes, I used minimum legal age drinking law (MLDA) of 21.  
Therefore, in the IV specifications per capita beer consumption is instrumented with excise beer, 
wine, and liquor taxes in addition to MLDA of 21.  
(2) Are excise taxes exogenous to income growth? 
Excise taxes need to be uncorrelated with the disturbance term in order for them to be valid 
instruments.  Excise alcohol taxes are quite static over time.  Once a level of excise taxes for 
alcohol is legislated, it takes eight to ten years before the new legislation.  Because of inflation, 
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the real value of levels of alcohol excise taxes diminishes over time and hence consumer price 
index (CPI) adjusted values of excise taxes are calculated.  Using CPI adjusted values of excise 
alcohol taxes increases their power in predicting alcohol consumption and abuse.  However, 
since inflation is known to affect economic growth, the validity of real excise alcohol taxes as 
instruments in growth equations is questionable.  That is, if inflation is determining both 
economic growth and real excise alcohol taxes, the exclusion of inflation from the specification 
can raise doubts about the validity of excise taxes as instruments.  Hence, in order to test whether 
CPI adjusted excise alcohol taxes are valid instruments for per capita beer consumption in 
estimating the impact of per capita beer consumption on per capita personal income growth, an 
over-identification test, which is Hansen J test, is employed in the IV specifications.  Therefore, 
the validity of real excise alcohol taxes as valid instruments in growth estimations is tested.  
Indeed, Hansen J test results show that CPI adjusted excise alcohol taxes are weak instruments 
(i.e., Hansen J test p-values are very close to 0.10).  Hence, since nominal values of excise 
alcohol taxes are theoretically exogenous to growth rates, all the specifications are also estimated 
by using nominal excise alcohol taxes.
20
  Using nominal values of levels of excise alcohol taxes 
ensures that excise alcohol taxes are exogenous to income growth whereas the power of nominal 
excise alcohol taxes to predict alcohol consumption and abuse is lower.  As expected, nominal 
values of excise alcohol taxes do not fail the over-identification test in addition being statistically 
significant determinants of per capita beer consumption.  Thus, estimations which use nominal 
excise taxes as the instrumental variables are the preferred specification in IV estimates.  
                                                            
20 One can argue that nominal legislation to change nominal excise alcohol are undertaken since the value of excise 
alcohol taxes shrinks over time due to inflation.  This is a valid argument.  However, it is safe to assume that the 
relationship between current inflation and the legislation with respect to nominal excise alcohol taxes is quite weak 
since such legislation is undertaken every eight to ten years.  
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 Table 2.8 presents the first stage estimates of per capita beer consumption.  The nominal 
excise beer tax elasticity of beer demand is -0.437 and it statistically significant at the one 
percent level.  Furthermore, an F test shows that nominal excise beer, wine and liquor taxes are 
jointly significant predictors of beer demand.    
Are there other suitable instruments? 
 As discussed above, survey data on a direct measure of alcohol abuse is neither reliable 
nor available for a long enough period of time for the purposes of this study.  Some other 
potential instruments are either not strong enough to predict alcohol abuse on themselves or not 
suitable instruments just because they violate the exclusion restrictions (i.e., they are very likely 
to be correlated with economic growth).  For instance, prevalence of dry counties in a state can 
successfully predict alcohol abuse, but I believe it is not a credible instrument in this context.  
Dry county laws have a direct impact on business activity since they automatically crowd out 
some businesses out of the county.  For instance, people from dry counties go to other counties 
to have entertainment involving alcohol and thus not only alcohol abuse but also business 
activity diminishes in the country.  Therefore it is not reasonable to claim that the complete 
effect of a dry county law is through alcohol abuse or consumption.  Furthermore, employing a 
fixed effects methodology controls some of the affects generated by dry county laws anyway.  
Overview before estimating the specifications 
Both yearly and four-year averages are estimated for both per capita beer consumption 
and excise alcohol taxes specifications.
21
  Even though four year averages control for the impact 
of business cycle on the estimates, their power to represent alcohol abuse is more questionable 
                                                            
21 Average business cycle is four to five years.  Hence, it is a common practice to have five year averages in growth 
equations.  However, five year averages produce the same results with four year averages.  Therefore, I prefer four 
year averages to five year averages since number of observations are higher with four year averages.  
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than yearly per capita beer consumption.  Ruhm and Black (2002) confirm the preceding 
literature and state that ―pro-cyclical variation in overall drinking largely result from changes in 
consumption by existing drinkers, rather than movements into or out of drinking.‖  Therefore, 
their results imply that prevalence of drinkers does not significantly change in a yearly 
framework.  Hence, we can assume the prevalence of drinking is quite steady in a yearly 
framework.  However, the same assumption may not apply to a four year period since it is likely 
that prevalence of alcohol consumption may change in a four year period.  One of the important 
questions to be answered before the estimations is whether the theoretical framework and the 
empirical methodology perfectly match each other (i.e., is per capita beer consumption is a 
perfect representative of alcohol abuse?).  Even though per capita beer consumption is the best 
available measure of the alcohol abuse at the aggregate level according to the literature referred 
above, it is far from being a perfect measure of alcohol abuse.  Because per capita beer 
consumption is not a perfect measure of alcohol abuse and it is likely to be correlated with 
moderate alcohol consumption to some degree, the estimates of this study should be interpreted 
with caution at least for two reasons: First, even though this study can provide insights on the 
direction of the impact of alcohol abuse at the aggregate level, the estimates probably lack 
precision (i.e., they may not represent true magnitude of the impact of abuse on income growth).  
Second, the estimates of this study should be interpreted as conservative estimates (i.e., a lower 
bound estimate of the impact of alcohol abuse on income growth).   
VII. Results 
Yearly Estimates 
 Table 2.2 presents the results for fixed effects estimates of income growth on per capita 
beer consumption for the yearly data.  In column (1) the coefficient on log of per capita beer 
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consumption is positive and statistically significant at five percent.  If it were to represent the 
causal relationship between per capita beer consumption and income growth the following 
conclusion could be made: a 50 percent increase in per capita beer consumption will lead to 
about 0.9 percentage point increase in income growth.  In column (2) the coefficient on log of 
per capita beer consumption is rendered insignificant once the effect of population controlled for.  
In column (3) percentage of population below 17 and percentage of population over 65  are 
controlled for.  Controlling for the impact of percentage of population below 17 and above 65 
does not have an impact on the coefficient for per capita beer consumption.  The fact that 
controlling for population renders the coefficient on log of per capita beer consumption 
significant suggests that alcohol related mortality is obviously a significant phenomenon.  It 
implies that alcohol related mortality puts an upward pressure on income growth.  
 Table 2.3 presents the instrumental variable estimates of the impact of per capita beer 
consumption on income growth when log of per capita beer consumption is instrumented with 
CPI adjusted excise alcohol taxes and MLDA of age 21.  Once per capita beer consumption is 
instrumented with CPI adjusted excise alcohol taxes and MLDA of age 21, the coefficient on per 
capita beer consumption becomes negative, but the coefficient is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  These estimates may not be reliable since the instruments fail the over-
identification test (i.e., Hansen J. test p value is less than 0.05 in column (1) and (3), and it is less 
than 0.10 in column (3)).  
 Table 2.4 presents the instrumental variable estimates of the impact of log of per capita 
beer consumption on income growth when per capita beer consumption is instrumented with 
nominal excise alcohol taxes and MLDA of age 21.  In column (1), the coefficient on log of per 
capita beer consumption is negative though it is not statistically significant at conventional 
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levels.  In column (2), once the log of population is controlled for, the coefficient on log of per 
capita beer consumption increase in magnitude and becomes statistically significant at the five 
percent level.  In column (3), the magnitude of the coefficient on log of per capita beer 
consumption slightly decreases once the impact of percentage of population below age 17 and 
above age 65 are controlled for.  The coefficient is statistically significant at the ten percent 
level.  These estimates seem to be reliable since the instruments do not fail the over-
identification test (i.e., in all cases Hansen J. test p value is well above 0.10).  According to these 
results, a 20 percent increase in per capita beer consumption leads to a one percentage point 
decrease in economic growth.  The magnitude of the coefficient is economically meaningful, too. 
Considering the Pareto law of consumption (in other words, the 80-20 rule discussed above), a 
20 percent increase in per capita beer consumption in a year yields a very significant increase in 
alcohol abuse which can obviously lead to economic outcomes through the various channels 
discussed earlier.   
 Other control variables are mostly in the expected direction.  The coefficient on initial 
income is negative, which confirms the presence of convergence; a higher public expenditure 
and total tax rate are associated with a lower income growth; higher federal government aid is 
associated with a lower income growth; a higher level of population is associated with a lower 
income growth; the coefficients on percent of population higher than age 65 is associated with a 
lower income growth; and the coefficient on percent of population younger than age 17 is 
positive, which is contrary to the expectation, though it is not statistically significant.  
Four Year Averages 
 The results with respect to four year estimates follow a similar pattern with yearly 
estimates.  However, the coefficient on per capita beer consumption is not statistically significant 
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in this case.  One of the reasons behind this fact is that even though per capita beer consumption 
is a good measure of alcohol abuse, its capacity to represent alcohol abuse may be lower when 
the data is averaged for four year periods.  For instance, the impact of changes in the prevalence 
of drinking may be more pressing in the long run and hence hinder the power of per capita beer 
consumption‘s representativeness of alcohol abuse.  Additionally, these estimates are 
conservative estimates which are likely representing the lower bound estimates of alcohol abuse 
on income growth because it is likely that changes in per capita beer consumption in the long run 
may be more strongly related to moderate alcohol consumption.    
VIII. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Considering the fact that per capita beer consumption does not change in great magnitude 
from year to year and hence alcohol abuse does not change dramatically as well, the share of 
alcohol abuse in per capita income growth is small in magnitude.  Therefore, it would be naïve to 
claim that curbing alcohol abuse would boost income growth tremendously.  
These results suggest that alcohol abuse has a negative impact on overall productivity 
even though the magnitude of alcohol abuse on income growth seems to be small at the 
aggregate level.  
These results definitely disprove the claim of NBWA with respect to the beer industry‘s 
contribution to economic growth through the expansion of the beer industry in the United States.  
Indeed, the beer industry does not contribute to economic growth at the aggregate level!  
Furthermore, objections to increases in excise alcohol taxes cannot be justified on efficiency 
grounds.  
It is well documented by various literature that alcohol, particularly beer, abuse generated 
externalities are large in magnitude. Various studies suggest that an increase in excise beer taxes 
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would reduce such externalities. These results suggest that increases in levels of excise beer 
taxes may not be inefficient in terms of income growth and therefore provide indirect support for 
the studies which advocate increases in excise alcohol taxes. Welfare implications of changes in 
the levels of excise alcohol taxes are viewed in a relatively close context. Effects of changes in 
excise alcohol taxes would depend on the changes in other taxes as well. Therefore, further 
analysis is necessary with respect to the efficiency implications of excise alcohol taxes. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Per-capita personal income growth 1296 0.02 0.03 
Average Total Tax Rate 1296 5.32 0.96 
Average Total Expenditure Rate 1296 6.91 1.46 
Per capita federal aid from Federal Govt. 1344 3.91 1.29 
Population  1344 4922.5 5137.4 
Percent of Population >65 1344 0.27 0.48 
Percent of Population <17 1344 0.33 0.39 
Per capita Personal Income 1344 12.63 2.39 
Per capita beer consumption in liters 1344 4.96 0.94 
Nominal - Excise beer tax 1344 0.57 0.21 
Nominal - Excise wine tax 1344 0.97 0.66 
Nominal - Excise liquor tax 1344 13.60 2.29 
CPI* Adjusted - Excise beer tax 1344 0.51 0.22 
CPI Adjusted  - Excise wine tax 1344 0.80 0.47 
CPI Adjusted - Excise liquor tax 1344 12.71 4.45 
*CPI base year is 1982-1984 
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Table 2.2: Yearly State Level Fixed Effects Estimates of Income Growth on Per Capita Beer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption 0.0179** 0.0133 0.0133 
 (0.00870) (0.00847) (0.00867) 
Average Total Tax Rate -0.00666 -0.00721* -0.00707* 
 (0.00407) (0.00384) (0.00381) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate  -0.00851** -0.00865** -0.00868** 
 (0.00339) (0.00340) (0.00341) 
Per Capita Federal Aid 0.00416 0.00218 0.00217 
 (0.00269) (0.00270) (0.00276) 
Lagged Per Capita Personal Income -0.0119*** -0.0119*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.00355) (0.00345) (0.00352) 
Log of population  -0.0309** -0.0316** 
  (0.0116) (0.0118) 
Percent population older than 65 years old   -0.00717 
   (0.00578) 
Percent population younger than 17 years old     0.00267 
   (0.00228) 
    
Observations 1248 1248 1248 
R-squared 0.600 0.604 0.604 
Number of states 48 48 48 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita personal income growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Lagged 
growth rates and year dummies are not reported. Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the 
percentages calculated based on gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.3: State Level IV Estimates with CPI adjusted Excise Alcohol Taxes Estimates of 
Income Growth on Per Capita Beer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption -0.0150 -0.0217 -0.0229 
 (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0154) 
Average Total Tax Rate -0.00709** -0.00774*** -0.00760*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00273) (0.00266) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate -0.00840*** -0.00856*** -0.00859*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00276) (0.00279) 
Per Capita Federal Aid 0.00431** 0.00205 0.00205 
 (0.00197) (0.00195) (0.00197) 
Lagged Per Capita Personal Income -0.0120*** -0.0121*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00146) (0.00144) (0.00144) 
Log of population  -0.0355*** -0.0364*** 
  (0.00855) (0.00852) 
Percent population older than 65 years old   -0.00729 
   (0.0156) 
Percent population younger than 17 years old     0.00259 
   (0.00577) 
    
Observations 1248 1248 1248 
R-squared 0.595 0.599 0.599 
Number of state 48 48 48 
Hansen J Test 10.18258 8.75974 7.53296 
Hansen J P-value 0.0171 0.0327 0.0567 
1st F-test 80.62 82.46 87.00 
1st p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.3018 0.2959 0.2957 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita personal income growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Lagged 
growth rates and year dummies are not reported. Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the 
percentages calculated based on gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.4: State Level IV Estimates with Nominal Excise Alcohol Taxes Estimates of 
Income Growth on Per Capita Beer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption -0.0101 -0.0558** -0.0513* 
 (0.0252) (0.0278) (0.0286) 
Average Total Tax Rate* -0.00702** -0.00826*** -0.00801*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00277) (0.00268) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate* -0.00842*** -0.00848*** -0.00851*** 
 (0.00271) (0.00276) (0.00279) 
Per Capita Federal Aid 0.00429** 0.00192 0.00195 
 (0.00196) (0.00201) (0.00202) 
Lagged Per Capita Personal Income -0.0120*** -0.0122*** -0.0121*** 
 (0.00146) (0.00145) (0.00146) 
Log of population  -0.0400*** -0.0402*** 
  (0.00958) (0.00948) 
Percent population older than 65 years old   -0.00740 
   (0.0156) 
Percent population younger than 17 years old     0.00253 
   (0.00581) 
    
Observations 1248 1248 1248 
R-squared 0.596 0.584 0.587 
Number of states 48 48 48 
Hansen J Test 0.93885 2.30721 0.14729 
Hansen J P-value 0.625 0.511 0.929 
1st F-test 53.20 32.14 38.33 
1st p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.0911 0.0759 0.0747 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita personal income growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Lagged 
growth rates and year dummies are not reported. Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the 
percentages calculated based on gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.5: Four Year Averages State Level Fixed Effects Estimates of Income Growth on Per Capita 
Beer 
 (1) (2)   (3) 
    
Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption 0.00839 0.00498 0.00487 
 (0.00519) (0.00600) (0.00571) 
Average Total Tax Rate 0.000365 -0.000410 -2.64e-05 
 (0.00506) (0.00480) (0.00460) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate -0.00806** -0.00805*** -0.00817*** 
 (0.00301) (0.00282) (0.00273) 
Per Capita Federal Aid 0.00389 0.00183 0.00182 
 (0.00244) (0.00279) (0.00297) 
Initial Per Capita Personal Income -0.00587*** -0.00600*** -0.00575*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00132) (0.00124) 
Log of population  -0.0232* -0.0244* 
  (0.0117) (0.0124) 
Percent population older than 65 years old   -0.0129* 
   (0.00656) 
Percent population younger than 17 years old     0.00511* 
   (0.00267) 
    
Observations 336 336 336 
R-squared 0.656 0.665 0.670 
Number of states 48 48 48 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita personal income growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Lagged 
growth rates and year dummies are not reported. Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the 
percentages calculated based on gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 p<0.1    
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Table 2.6: State Level IV Estimates with CPI adjusted Excise Alcohol Taxes Estimates of 
Income Growth on Per Capita Beer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption -0.00243 -0.00773 -0.00934 
 (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0120) 
Average Total Tax Rate* 0.000101 -0.000767 -0.000414 
 (0.00329) (0.00309) (0.00305) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate* -0.00792*** -0.00788*** -0.00798*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00212) (0.00212) 
Per Capita Federal Aid 0.00390* 0.00171 0.00168 
 (0.00218) (0.00222) (0.00231) 
Initial Per Capita Personal Income -0.00590*** -0.00604*** -0.00580*** 
 (0.00120) (0.00118) (0.00119) 
Log of population  -0.0247** -0.0262*** 
  (0.00964) (0.00985) 
Percent population older than 65 years old   -0.0130 
   (0.0125) 
Percent population younger than 17 years old     0.00515 
   (0.00473) 
    
Observations 336 336 336 
R-squared 0.654 0.663 0.667 
Number of states  48 48 48 
Hansen J Test 5.04601 5.70469 5.12586 
Hansen J P-value 0.0802 0.0577 0.0771 
1st F-test 34.96 35.27 35.57 
1st p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.3466 .3390 0.3402 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita personal income growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Lagged 
growth rates and year dummies are not reported. Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the 
percentages calculated based on gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 p<0.1    
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Table 2.7: State Level IV Estimates with Nominal Excise Alcohol Taxes Estimates of Income Growth 
on Per Capita Beer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption -0.0102 -0.0416 -0.0372 
 (0.0238) (0.0267) (0.0280) 
Average Total Tax Rate* -8.85e-05 -0.00172 -0.00117 
 (0.00340) (0.00333) (0.00331) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate* -0.00782*** -0.00744*** -0.00762*** 
 (0.00228) (0.00223) (0.00224) 
Per-capita Federal Aid 0.00391* 0.00138 0.00142 
 (0.00221) (0.00249) (0.00256) 
Initial Per Capita Personal Income -0.00592*** -0.00615*** -0.00588*** 
 (0.00119) (0.00115) (0.00118) 
Log of population  -0.0289** -0.0296** 
  (0.0115) (0.0117) 
Percent population older than 65 years old   -0.0134 
   (0.0127) 
Percent population younger than 17 years old     0.00522 
   (0.00480) 
    
Observations 336 336 336 
R-squared 0.651 0.633 0.644 
Number of states 48 48 48 
Hansen J Test 2.80957 2.05381 0.81650 
Hansen J P-value 0.245 0.358 0.665 
1st F-test 16.51 17.36 12.39 
1st p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.1066 0.0911 0.0917 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita personal income growth. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Lagged 
growth rates and year dummies are not reported. Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the 
percentages calculated based on gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 p<0.1    
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Table 2.8: First Stage Estimates of Per Capita Beer Consumption 
 (1) 
  
Log of nominal excise beer tax -0.437*** 
 (0.0653) 
Log of nominal excise wine tax -0.00590 
 (0.0227) 
Log of nominal excise liquor tax 0.359 
 (0.215) 
Minimum drinking age is 21 -0.0176 
 (0.0156) 
Income growth 0.181* 
 (0.101) 
Lagged income growth 0.173* 
 (0.0866) 
Average Total Tax Rate* -0.0102 
 (0.00951) 
Average Total Public Expenditure Rate*   0.00285 
 (0.00696) 
Per Capita Federal Aid 0.00384 
 (0.0111) 
Lagged Per Capita Personal Income 0.00292 
 (0.00912) 
  
Observations 1248 
Number of states 48 
R-squared 0.451 
F test 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is per capita beer consumption in liters. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Year 
dummies and the constant term are not reported. F test pertains to the joint significance of beer, wine and liquor 
excise taxes.  Average total tax rate and average total public expenditure are the percentages calculated based on 
gross state product. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 p<0.1  
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Introduction
22
 
   
 As opposed to the first chapter, which uses data from the United States and utilizes per 
capita beer consumption as the measure of alcohol abuse, there is no universal evidence claiming 
that a particular alcoholic beverage (i.e., beer, wine or liquor) is the medium of alcohol abuse 
(i.e., a good proxy for alcohol abuse in a country) around the world.  Therefore, not only per 
capita beer consumption, but also per capita wine, per capita liquor and per capita total ethanol 
consumption are separately estimated.  Based on the evidence presented in the first chapter of 
this dissertation, per capita alcohol consumption measures are the best proxies for alcohol abuse 
at the aggregate level.  Hence, chapter two of this dissertation attempts to uncover the causal 
impact of alcohol abuse on income growth using country level aggregate data from 72 countries.  
Results suggest that once the endogeneity between per capita beer consumption and income 
growth is addressed by employing system Generalized Method of Moments dynamic panel 
estimator method, the negative impact of alcohol abuse on income growth is uncovered.  
Furthermore, these results suggest that beer is the medium of alcohol abuse not only in the 
United States but also around the globe.  The next section continues with presenting the data and 
empirical methodology.  Section 3 presents the results.  Section 4 concludes.    
II. Data and Empirical Methodology 
Data 
The data for alcohol consumption were obtained from the World Health Organization‘s 
Global Alcohol Database.  Estimated amount of pure ethanol in terms of liters for total ethanol 
and separately beer, wine, and spirits per-person yearly consumption is the unit of measure.  
                                                            
22 Please refer to Chapter II, parts ―Introduction,‖ ―Micro Channels,‖ and ―Theoretical Framework‖ for a longer 
discussion.  
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These calculations are mostly made based on official statistics on production, sales, import and 
export while taking stocks into consideration whenever possible.
23
 
The aggregate nature of the data imposes some limitations in the analysis.  One of the 
major shortcomings of the data is that they do not provide information about how the distribution 
of alcohol consumption changes in a country when alcohol sales increase or decrease.  An 
increase in alcohol sales may mean that same group of individuals drink more on average or 
there is an increase in the number of drinkers or both and vice versa.  Hence, compositional 
assumptions need to be made here.  Ruhm and Black (2002) confirm the preceding literature and 
state that ―pro-cyclical variation in overall drinking largely result from changes in consumption 
by existing drinkers, rather than movements into or out of drinking.‖   Therefore, their results 
imply that prevalence of drinkers does not significantly change in a yearly framework.  Changes 
in alcohol sales implies that existing drinkers change their drinking habits such as some moderate 
drinkers become heavy drinkers and some light drinkers become moderate drinkers and vice 
versa.  
Tourist and overseas consumption can have different effects.  Obviously, the 
interpretation of the effects of such factors on this analysis depends on the signs of the 
coefficients.  If increases in alcohol sales have negative effects on income growth, presence of 
tourist and overseas consumption, expected to have a positive effect in themselves on alcohol 
sales and thus GDP, would cause the coefficients to be smaller since tourist and overseas 
consumption do not impose the costs of alcohol consumption on the countries where the alcohol 
                                                            
23 Detailed information on the data is provided in the Appendix 1.   
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is consumed.  On the other hand, if the effect is positive, tourist and overseas consumption would 
cause the coefficients be larger than actually they are.
 24
  
Because the data are established based on administrative sources, the variables are 
expected to be biased downward.
25
  In the case of cross sectional analysis, this would cause 
serious problems.  However, since we have panel data, changes in alcohol sales over time can 
still explain a substantial amount as long as the direction of bias is not changing over time.  
Hence, in the following analysis I will assume that the direction of bias does not change over 
time. 
Data for growth variables are obtained from the World Bank web site: Beck et. al. (2002) 
Financial Intermediation Data Set.  The sample is reduced to 72 countries because of the 
limitations with respect to control variables.  Data are averaged over five-year intervals: 1960-
1965, 1965-1970, 1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995, so there are seven 
variable for a country when available.  Data are averaged over five year periods in order control 
for the effects of business cycle.  Averaging the data has both advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of quantifying alcohol abuse.  Because it is possible that prevalence of drinking and abuse 
may change in a five year period, changes in five year averaged alcohol consumption may not 
successfully represent the changes in alcohol abuse.  Nevertheless, considering the fact that this 
is an international data set, measurement error in the yearly data, which may lead to attenuation 
bias, can very well be more prevalent.  Furthermore, some of the control variables are only 
available in five year periods only.  Hence, estimations with yearly are ruled out.   
                                                            
24 Note that if tourists contribute to traffic fatalities or crime, or even emergency health costs, through alcohol 
consumption, then this effect might turn negative.  These effects, however, are expected to be negligible. 
25 Detailed information is provided in the Appendix 1.  
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Descriptive statistics for growth equations are presented in Table 3.1.  Average growth 
rate is 1.78 percent.  Per capita consumption levels for beer, wine and, spirits are 2.23, 2.06, and 
1.69 liters respectively.  Per capita alcohol consumption on average is 6.08 liters.  
 
Empirical Methodology 
Econometrics techniques used in this paper are country fixed effects and Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimators, which has been used by a variety of 
authors including, Levine et al (2000), Beck et al. (2000), and Rioja and Valev (2004). 
Particularly a GMM System dynamic panel data estimation technique is used besides a 
Generalized Least Squares methodology. The major reason behind using System GMM, which is 
fully developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) and, Bond et al. (2001), is to deal with the potential endogeneity in the data by using 
internal instruments where external instruments are not available.  
Another way of dealing with the endogeneity issue is by applying an instrumental 
variable methodology.  However, in the international level data sets the availability of 
instruments is highly limited.  Therefore, GMM System dynamic panel data estimating 
techniques became the standard since they deal with the possible endogeneity by creating 
internal instruments. 
System GMM estimation technique addresses the potential ―econometrics problems 
induced by unobserved individual (country)-specific effects and joint endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in lagged-dependent variable models, such as growth regressions.‖  The 
model undertaken here is fully described by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Bond et al. (2001).  The following is the model estimated. 
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tiitititi Xyy ,,1,,         (1) 
 
where the left side of the argument, is the growth rate per-capita GDP,  productivity growth, or 
capital growth, depending on the model estimated. 1, tiy  is the lagged value of dependent 
variable, tiX ,  represents a vector of independent variables: measures of alcohol consumption; 
initial GDP, which controls for income convergence; government size of GDP controls the 
impact of government presence on income growth; trade share of GDP controls for the impact of 
international openness on income growth; inflation rate controls for the impact of inflation on 
income growth; average years of secondary schooling controls for the impact of education on 
income growth; black market premium controls the impact of functioning of free markets on 
income growth;  i  is the country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and ti,  is the error term.  
In order to account for country specific heterogeneity first differences of equation (1) are taken 
     1,,1,,2,1,1,,   titititititititi XXyyyy    (2) 
However, in addition to the potential endogeneity of the dependent variable with the 
independent variables, now we have a problem of serial correlation since the new error 
term, 1,,  titi   is correlated with the lagged dependent variable 2,1,   titi yy .  Under the 
assumptions that error term is not serially correlated and the explanatory variables are weakly 
exogenous, the following moment conditions are used by GMM dynamic panel estimator.  
   TtsforyE titisti ,....,3;201,,,       (3) 
   TtsforXE titisti ,....,3;201,,,       (4) 
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The GMM estimator based on these conditions is called GMM difference estimator.  One 
important feature of the model undertaken, as is stated in the moment conditions, is that in order 
to implement GMM dynamic panel estimators one needs to have the data for each country in 
three consecutive periods or more.  Otherwise, the model undertaken cannot exploit the 
necessary moment conditions.  
In GMM difference estimator, the predetermined and endogenous variables in first 
differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels.  Strictly exogenous covariates 
and instruments enter the model in the usual fashion.  One problem with this model is that lagged 
levels are in general bad instruments for first differences, particularly when variables follow a 
random walk.  
Therefore the difference estimator is further combined by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
with an estimator in levels to produce a system estimator because the persistence in the 
independent variables can adversely affect the small-sample and asymptotic properties of the 
difference estimator.  They showed how the efficiency of the model can be increased further by 
bringing additional moment conditions if the original equations in levels were added to the 
system.  This model uses the same instruments for the regression in differences.  However, 
lagged differences are used as instruments for regression in levels.  Blundell and Bond (1998) 
improved the model by introducing further necessary assumptions, which they tested with Monte 
Carlo simulations.  These further assumptions are as follows: error terms are not serially 
correlated and there is no correlation between the difference in the explanatory variables and the 
error term even though individual (country)-specific error terms and levels of explanatory 
variables may be correlated.  Hence the following stationary properties are achieved. 
56 
 
   
      q. and p allfor ,,
,,
iqtiipti
iqtiipti
XEXEand
yEyE






  (5) 
For the second part of the system there are following additional moment conditions:  
    10,1,,   sforyyE tiististi      (6)                                     
    10,1,,   sforXXE tiististi  .              (7) 
By using the moment conditions stated in the equations (3), (4), (6) and (7) and 
employing GMM procedure, consistent and efficient parameter estimates can be generated.  
Meanwhile, the validity of the instruments generated by System GMM estimator is vital 
since System GMM estimators are not otherwise consistent.  A Hansen J test is employed in 
order to test the validity of the internal instruments – that is, the null hypothesis that the lagged 
differences of the explanatory variables are not correlated with the residuals.  Therefore, in order 
for the instruments to be valid we should not be able to reject the null hypothesis that instruments 
are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
A second test, which is called the Arellano Bond test, is undertaken in order to test 
whether the error term ti,  is serially correlated.  Our main interest here is whether a second-
order serial correlation exits. The way the model is constructed, a first-order serial correlation is 
expected. That is, the differenced error term 1,,,.  tititiD  , should correlate with  
2,1,1,.   tititiD   since they share the term 1, ti .  Nevertheless, presence of a higher-order 
autocorrelation shows that some lags of the dependent variable, which might be used as 
instruments, are in fact endogenous and thus bad instruments.  That is, 2, tiy , where 2 is the lag, 
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would be correlated with 2, ti , which would be correlated with 2,. tiD  , which would be 
correlated with tiD ,.  if there is AR(2).   Therefore, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
errors in the first-differenced regression do not exhibit second-order serial correlation, we can 
state that our instruments are serially uncorrelated.   
Since the standard deviations of two-step GMM System estimators tend to be 
significantly downward biased according to Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), Windmeijer‘s (2005) finite sample correction is applied.  Hence, all the standard errors 
are robust standard errors.  
Robustness Checks with Productivity Growth and Capital Growth 
In addition to income growth regressions, specifications which estimate productivity 
growth and capital growth are employed in order to check the robustness of the results since 
productivity growth and capital growth are the sources income of growth.  
The measure of productivity is derived from the Neoclassical Production Function with 
physical capital K, labor L, and the level of total factor productivity A.  The underlying 
assumption here is that there is a common production function across the countries.  That is, the 
aggregate production in a country is given by the following production function. 
  1iii LKAY         (8) 
where iY  is the output for country i, K is capital, L is labor, A is productivity, and the constant 
returns to scale assumption is imposed.  In order to solve for growth rate of productivity, both 
sides are divided by L to get the per capita production.  Then natural logs of both sides and time 
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derivates are taken.  At the end capital share of production is assumed as α=0.3 and solved for 
growth rate of capital. Hence we have:  
Productivity Growth=Growth-0.3*Capital-Growth   (9) 
III. Results 
Table 3.2 presents OLS with fixed effects estimates of income growth.  Per capita alcohol 
consumption measures are positively related to income growth.  The coefficients on control 
variables are mostly in the expected direction.  F test p-value pertains to joint significance of 
control variables other than per-capita alcohol consumption measures.  They are jointly 
significant at one percent level.  Because of the potential endogeneity between per capita alcohol 
consumption and income growth (i.e., reverse causality and omitted variables bias), OLS may 
not represent the causal relationship between the two.  Table 3.3 presents the results for GMM 
system dynamic panel data estimators.  The p-value on Hansen J-test shows that the null 
hypothesis, GMM type instruments are correlated with the error term, cannot be rejected. P-value 
on AR (2) shows that errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial 
correlation.  Therefore, GMM type instrument are valid instruments.  Once the endogeneity 
between per capita alcohol consumption measures and income growth is controlled for, the 
coefficient on per capita beer consumption becomes negative and statistically significant at the 
10 percent level.  The coefficient on log of per capita beer consumption shows that a 100 percent 
increase in per capita beer consumption leads to a 2.26 percentage point decrease in income 
growth.  The coefficients on other measures of per capita alcohol consumption measures are 
neither statistically significant nor large in magnitude.  The magnitude of the coefficient on per 
capita beer consumption is economically meaningful.  Considering the ―Pareto Law of 
Consumption‖ (i.e., 20 percent of the consumers consume 80 percent of a good consumed in the 
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market), a 100 percent increase in per capita beer consumption is likely to represent a 
tremendous increase in alcohol abuse.  Again, given the fact that per capita beer consumption is 
not a perfect measure of alcohol abuse, it is hard to claim that these estimates are precise.  
However, these results hint that there is a negative relationship between alcohol abuse and 
income growth.  Control variables are in the expected direction: black market premium is 
negatively related income growth; secondary schooling is positively related to income growth; 
inflation is negatively related to income growth; trade share of GDP is positively related income 
growth; government share of GDP is negatively related to income growth; and initial GDP is 
positively related to income growth at low levels of GDP, with the coefficient becoming negative 
at higher levels of GDP.  Control variables are jointly significant at the one percent level.  Some 
of them are statistically significant at conventional levels on their own.  
Table 3.4 presents the OLS estimates of productivity growth.  In OLS estimates the 
coefficient on per capita alcohol consumption measures is positive and it is statistically 
significant at the five percent level for per capita beer consumption and per capita liquor 
consumption.  Table 3.5 presents the GMM system estimates of productivity growth.  Once the 
endogeneity between income growth and per capita alcohol consumption measures are controlled 
for, the coefficients on per capita alcohol consumption measures change sign and become 
negative.  The coefficient on per capita beer consumption is statistically significant at the ten 
percent level.  The coefficients on other measures of per capita alcohol consumption are neither 
statistically significant at conventional levels nor large in magnitude.  Hence, these results show 
that alcohol abuse seems to affect productivity growth through the channels presented above.  
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Table .6 and Table 7 repeat the OLS and GMM system estimations for capital growth.  
The coefficients on per capita alcohol consumption measures are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels in any cases.  
Table 3.8 presents the results for GMM system income growth estimates with legal origin 
and financial structure variables as controls.  Results are very similar to those in Table 3.3, which 
presents GMM system income growth estimates with conventional control variables.  Once there 
is a negative relationship between per capita beer consumption and income growth.  The 
coefficients on other measures of alcohol consumption are neither large in magnitude nor 
statistically significant.  
Table 3.9 presents the GMM system productivity growth estimates using financial 
structure and legal origin as control variables.  Results are very similar to those in Table 3.5, 
which presents the GMM system productivity growth estimates using conventional control 
variables. 
Table 3.10 presents the GMM system capital growth estimates using financial structure 
and legal origin as control variables. Results are qualitative similar to those in Table 3.7.  
IV. Conclusions 
 This chapter attempts to uncover the causal relationship between alcohol abuse and 
income growth in a cross country setting.  Because there is no established literature stating that a 
particular alcoholic beverage type is the medium of alcohol abuse around the world, all measures 
of per capita alcohol consumption are considered in estimating the relationship between alcohol 
abuse and income growth.  There seems to be a negative relationship between per capita beer 
consumption and income growth.  Other measures of per capita alcohol consumption do not 
seem to have an effect on income growth.  
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 A natural question arises out of these results: Why does beer have a negative impact on 
GDP growth and not other measures of alcohol consumption?  The relationship between alcohol 
abuse and per capita beer consumption may be similar to the one in the U.S. all around the 
world.  That is, beer drinking would be more prevalent and among those alcohol abuse would be 
more common in comparison to other alcoholic beverage types.  That is, beer drinkers may be 
the ones who are more likely consume excessively as is the case in the United States.  
Furthermore, the beer industry is one of industries in which there is a high concentration ratio 
(i.e., a few firms sharing most of the market share) while this is not the case for liquor and wine.  
Presence of high concentration may reduce the possibilities for measurement error since larger 
firms are more likely to report their volume of business accurately.   
 These results should be interpreted with caution for a few reasons.  First, even though 
these results strongly suggest a relationship between alcohol abuse and aggregate income 
growth, because they are based on reduced form estimates, they may not be precise.  Second, 
these results definitely do not suggest a negative relationship between alcohol consumption in 
general and income growth since there is no theoretical basis for such an assertion.  Third, these 
results do not suggest that alcohol abuse generated by wine or liquor consumption does not have 
economic consequences.  
 These results provide evidence in favor of the economic literature suggesting an increase 
in excise alcohol taxes on efficiency grounds in terms of income growth though commenting the 
magnitude of such excise alcohol tax increases is beyond the scope this analysis.  
 Further research attempting to uncover the magnitude of the relationship between alcohol 
abuse and aggregate productivity is necessary and can contribute to the literature and policy 
discussion tremendously. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
GDP Growth .0178 
 (.0286) 
Productivity Growth .0102 
 (.0248) 
Capital Growth .0273 
 (.0342) 
Initial GDP 3920.588 
 (4802.72) 
Government Share of GDP .146 
 (.0586) 
Trade Share of GDP .5532 
 (.3059) 
Inflation Rate .1525 
 (.2943) 
Average Years of Secondary Schooling 1.1516 
 (.9602) 
Black Market Premium .6794 
 (5.5667) 
Commercial-Central Bank, period average .7763 
 (.1969) 
Bank Assets period, average .3704 
 (.2855) 
Private Credit, period average .3803 
 (.329) 
Liquid Liabilities, period average .4188 
 (.2566) 
French legal origin .5278 
 (.4997) 
German legal origin .0694 
 (.2545) 
Scandinavian legal origin .0556 
 (.2293) 
Per capita beer consumption 2.2554 
 (2.1971) 
Per capita wine consumption 2.058 
 (3.8352) 
Per capita liquor consumption 1.6884 
 (1.425) 
Per capita ethanol consumption  6.0606 
 (5.0778) 
  
Observations 511 
    Standard deviations in parentheses.  
63 
 
 
Table 3.2: Fixed Effects Income Growth Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption 0.0114    
 (0.00890)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  0.00119   
  (0.00841)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   0.0171  
   (0.0119)  
Logarithm of Per capita total ethanol consumption    0.00376 
    (0.0113) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita -0.0335 -0.0299 -0.0546 -0.0340 
 (0.0579) (0.0568) (0.0559) (0.0554) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita Squared -0.00176 -0.00174 -0.000304 -0.00151 
 (0.00357) (0.00356) (0.00359) (0.00350) 
Logarithm of Government Size -0.0196* -0.0188* -0.0208* -0.0192* 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
Logarithm of Trade Share of GDP 0.00722 0.00829 0.00717 0.00794 
 (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
Logarithm of (1+Inflation) -0.0369*** -0.0353*** -0.0340*** -0.0356*** 
 (0.00711) (0.00678) (0.00648) (0.00674) 
Logarithm  of Years of Secondary Schooling -0.00836 -0.00815 -0.00879 -0.00810 
 (0.00521) (0.00546) (0.00538) (0.00526) 
Logarithm of (1+Black Market Premium) -0.00323 -0.00362 -0.00412 -0.00359 
 (0.00682) (0.00679) (0.00696) (0.00683) 
     
Observations 384 384 384 384 
R-squared 0.346 0.342 0.350 0.343 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 
F test p-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Note: Dependent variable is per capita GDP growth. F test p-value refers to the joint significance of independent 
variables excluding per capita alcohol consumption measures.  Controls for country fixed effects, year dummies, and 
a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 3.3: GMM System Income Growth Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption -0.0226*    
 (0.0114)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  0.00499   
  (0.00776)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   -0.000701  
   (0.0146)  
Logarithm of Per capita total ethanol consumption    -0.00162 
    (0.0106) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita 0.0199 0.0338 0.0518 0.0210 
 (0.0504) (0.0733) (0.0648) (0.0816) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita Squared -0.00121 -0.00274 -0.00371 -0.00171 
 (0.00316) (0.00451) (0.00400) (0.00497) 
Logarithm of Government Size -0.0134 -0.0211 -0.0258* -0.0224 
 (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0184) 
Logarithm of Trade Share of GDP 0.0101 0.00633 0.00661 0.00319 
 (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.00954) (0.0124) 
Logarithm of (1+Inflation) -0.0177 -0.0294* -0.0334** -0.0226 
 (0.0170) (0.0160) (0.0168) (0.0169) 
Logarithm  of Years of Secondary Schooling 0.0218** 0.0222** 0.0203** 0.0231* 
 (0.00907) (0.0100) (0.00928) (0.0121) 
Logarithm of (1+Black Market Premium) -0.0139** -0.0101 -0.0115 -0.0129* 
 (0.00680) (0.00634) (0.00778) (0.00753) 
     
Observations 384 384 384 384 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 
Hansen J Test 54.31049 53.98011 55.35455 56.22047 
Hansen J P-value 0.247 0.257 0.217 0.194 
AR (1) -3.333 -3.176 -3.244 -3.225 
AR(1) p-value 0.000860 0.00149 0.00118 0.00126 
AR (2) -0.520 -0.239 -0.406 -0.363 
AR(2) p-value 0.603 0.811 0.685 0.716 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Dependent variable is per capita GDP growth. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether GMM type instruments 
are correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that GMM type instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error terms). AR (1) p-value refers to whether there is a first degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. 
AR (2) p-value refers to whether there is a second degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. F test p-
value refers to the joint significance of independent variables excluding per capita alcohol consumption measures.  
Controls for country fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 3.4: Fixed Effects Productivity Growth Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption 0.0156*    
 (0.00914)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  0.00209   
  (0.00721)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   0.0239**  
   (0.0111)  
Logarithm of Per capita total ethanol consumption    0.00907 
    (0.0109) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita -0.0396 -0.0342 -0.0712 -0.0439 
 (0.0599) (0.0587) (0.0590) (0.0571) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita Squared -0.00164 -0.00168 0.000468 -0.00113 
 (0.00360) (0.00359) (0.00365) (0.00350) 
Logarithm of Government Size -0.0186* -0.0184* -0.0214* -0.0194* 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0108) 
Logarithm of Trade Share of GDP 0.00154 0.00310 0.00112 0.00220 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Logarithm of (1+Inflation) -0.0387*** -0.0364*** -0.0345*** -0.0371*** 
 (0.00900) (0.00890) (0.00786) (0.00876) 
Logarithm  of Years of Secondary Schooling -0.00764* -0.00727 -0.00790* -0.00711 
 (0.00434) (0.00452) (0.00452) (0.00448) 
Logarithm of (1+Black Market Premium) -0.00249 -0.00279 -0.00401 -0.00287 
 (0.00559) (0.00562) (0.00549) (0.00560) 
     
Observations 378 378 378 378 
R-squared 0.325 0.317 0.336 0.321 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 
F test 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Note: Dependent variable is productivity growth. F test p-value refers to the joint significance of independent 
variables excluding per capita alcohol consumption measures.  Controls for country fixed effects, year dummies, and 
a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 3.5: GMM System Productivity Growth Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption -0.0219*    
 (0.0126)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  -0.000886   
  (0.00834)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   -0.00277  
   (0.0129)  
Logarithm of Per capita total ethanol consumption    -0.00473 
    (0.00921) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita 0.000962 -0.00844 -0.00913 -0.0178 
 (0.0647) (0.0569) (0.0681) (0.0687) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita Squared 0.000180 0.000367 0.000384 0.00101 
 (0.00390) (0.00365) (0.00426) (0.00421) 
Logarithm of Government Size -0.0140 -0.0140 -0.0211 -0.0181 
 (0.0183) (0.0157) (0.0172) (0.0169) 
Logarithm of Trade Share of GDP -0.0133 -0.0173 -0.0137 -0.0182 
 (0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0130) (0.0127) 
Logarithm of (1+Inflation) -0.0218 -0.0236 -0.0271 -0.0216 
 (0.0184) (0.0149) (0.0168) (0.0145) 
Logarithm  of Years of Secondary Schooling 0.0149 0.0163 0.0190** 0.0201* 
 (0.00987) (0.0104) (0.00950) (0.0104) 
Logarithm of (1+Black Market Premium) -0.0140** -0.0117** -0.0100* -0.0124** 
 (0.00578) (0.00559) (0.00530) (0.00574) 
     
Observations 378 378 378 378 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 
Hansen J Test 56.08628 60.45422 55.25824 55.99077 
Hansen J P-value 0.198 0.107 0.220 0.200 
AR (1) -3.157 -3.134 -3.092 -2.970 
AR(1) p-value 0.00160 0.00172 0.00199 0.00298 
AR (2) -0.869 -0.639 -0.704 -0.763 
AR(2) p-value 0.385 0.523 0.481 0.446 
F test 0.000400 2.48e-05 0.000274 0.000701 
Note: Dependent variable is productivity growth. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether GMM type instruments are 
correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that GMM type instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
terms). AR (1) p-value refers to whether there is a first degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. AR (2) 
p-value refers to whether there is a second degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. F test p-value 
refers to the joint significance of independent variables excluding per capita alcohol consumption measures.  
Controls for country fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Fixed Effects Capital Growth Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption -0.00985    
 (0.0112)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  -0.00235   
  (0.0102)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   -0.0124  
   (0.00989)  
Logarithm of Per capita ethanol consumption    -0.00736 
    (0.00941) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita 0.0978** 0.0933** 0.113** 0.102** 
 (0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0484) (0.0465) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita Squared -0.00517* -0.00507* -0.00621** -0.00557* 
 (0.00269) (0.00278) (0.00299) (0.00290) 
Logarithm of Government Size -0.0138 -0.0140 -0.0124 -0.0132 
 (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0149) 
Logarithm of Trade Share of GDP 0.0111 0.0100 0.0110 0.0108 
 (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0119) 
Logarithm of (1+Inflation) -0.0142 -0.0158 -0.0161 -0.0151 
 (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0124) (0.0125) 
Logarithm  of Years of Secondary Schooling -0.00619 -0.00645 -0.00614 -0.00657 
 (0.00795) (0.00814) (0.00777) (0.00787) 
Logarithm of (1+Black Market Premium) -0.00453 -0.00440 -0.00377 -0.00433 
 (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0112) 
     
Observations 386 386 386 386 
R-squared 0.374 0.372 0.375 0.373 
Number of countries 73 73 73 73 
F test 0.29194 0.32606 0.27243 0.31845 
Note: Dependent variable is capital growth. F test p-value refers to the joint significance of independent variables 
excluding per capita alcohol consumption measures.  Controls for country fixed effects, year dummies, and a 
constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 3.7: GMM System Capital Growth Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption -0.0167    
 (0.0242)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  0.00451   
  (0.00858)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   -0.0115  
   (0.0209)  
Logarithm of Per capita ethanol consumption    0.0131 
    (0.0147) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita -0.0188 0.0325 0.0514 -0.00542 
 (0.0523) (0.0510) (0.0724) (0.0583) 
Logarithm of Initial Income Per Capita Squared 0.00111 -0.00252 -0.00361 -0.000454 
 (0.00319) (0.00318) (0.00445) (0.00348) 
Logarithm of Government Size -0.00318 -0.0220 -0.0136 -0.0118 
 (0.0200) (0.0209) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Logarithm of Trade Share of GDP 0.0344** 0.0286 0.0349 0.0283 
 (0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0222) (0.0185) 
Logarithm of (1+Inflation) 0.00617 -0.00804 0.00240 -0.00399 
 (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0159) (0.0137) 
Logarithm  of Years of Secondary Schooling 0.0181 0.0185 0.0201 0.0191 
 (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0137) 
Logarithm of (1+Black Market Premium) -0.00645 -0.00345 -0.00548 -0.00576 
 (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0130) 
     
Observations 386 386 386 386 
Number of countries 73 73 73 73 
Hansen J Test 60.10567 58.56599 59.62452 59.22431 
Hansen J P-value 0.113 0.141 0.121 0.128 
AR (1) -2.787 -2.747 -2.960 -2.739 
AR(1) p-value 0.00532 0.00602 0.00307 0.00615 
AR (2) -1.265 -1.049 -1.075 -1.122 
AR(2) p-value 0.206 0.294 0.283 0.262 
F test 0.402 0.300 0.482 0.350 
Note: Dependent variable is capital growth. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether GMM type instruments are 
correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that GMM type instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
terms). AR (1) p-value refers to whether there is a first degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. AR (2) 
p-value refers to whether there is a second degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. F test p-value 
refers to the joint significance of independent variables excluding per capita alcohol consumption measures.  
Controls for country fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: GMM System Growth Estimates with Legal Origin and Financial Structure Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption -0.0410**    
 (0.0175)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption  -0.00176   
  (0.0209)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   0.0295  
   (0.0226)  
Logarithm of Per capita ethanol consumption     -0.00871 
    (0.0294) 
Commercial-Central Bank, period average 0.0850** 0.0203 0.0605 0.0283 
 (0.0411) (0.0631) (0.0441) (0.0660) 
Bank Assets period, average -0.0153 -0.0163 -0.0103 -0.0175 
 (0.0385) (0.0552) (0.0465) (0.0661) 
Private Credit, period average 0.0319 0.0551 0.0330 0.0436 
 (0.0359) (0.0467) (0.0352) (0.0428) 
Liquid Liabilities, period average -0.0378 -0.0812 -0.0762* -0.0775 
 (0.0526) (0.0719) (0.0419) (0.0718) 
French legal origin 0.0406* 0.154 0.0995* 0.173* 
 (0.0217) (0.102) (0.0566) (0.101) 
German legal origin 0.123 0.380 0.219 0.484 
 (0.0799) (0.253) (0.147) (0.311) 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.0750 0.223 -0.0234 0.288 
 (0.124) (0.228) (0.208) (0.305) 
     
Observations 391 391 391 391 
Number of countries 71 71 71 71 
Hansen J Test 39.56815 44.86927 37.69879 40.12951 
Hansen J P-value 0.578 0.352 0.660 0.553 
AR (1) -2.966 -2.478 -2.369 -2.422 
AR(1) p-value 0.00302 0.0132 0.0178 0.0154 
AR (2) 0.104 -0.370 -0.400 -0.709 
AR(2) p-value 0.917 0.712 0.689 0.478 
Note: Dependent variable is per capita GDP growth. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether GMM type instruments 
are correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that GMM type instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error terms). AR (1) p-value refers to whether there is a first degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. 
AR (2) p-value refers to whether there is a second degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. Controls for 
country fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 3.9: GMM System Productivity Growth Estimates with Legal Origin and Financial Structure Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per- capita beer consumption -0.0343*    
 (0.0179)    
Logarithm of Per- capita wine consumption  0.000801   
  (0.0167)   
Logarithm of Per- capita liquor consumption   0.0266  
   (0.0201)  
Logarithm of Per- capita ethanol consumption    -0.00356 
    (0.0248) 
Commercial-Central Bank, period average 0.108** 0.0500 0.0664* 0.0467 
 (0.0459) (0.0616) (0.0387) (0.0615) 
Bank Assets period, average -0.0228 -0.0294 -0.0352 -0.0341 
 (0.0354) (0.0536) (0.0557) (0.0584) 
Private Credit, period average -0.00129 0.0159 0.0121 0.0186 
 (0.0236) (0.0378) (0.0327) (0.0345) 
Liquid Liabilities, period average 0.00155 -0.0427 -0.0312 -0.0355 
 (0.0569) (0.0582) (0.0487) (0.0651) 
French legal origin 0.0185 0.0896 0.0654 0.113 
 (0.0207) (0.0776) (0.0469) (0.0910) 
German legal origin 0.101 0.284 0.182 0.318 
 (0.103) (0.244) (0.157) (0.280) 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.0863 0.122 -0.0377 0.133 
 (0.123) (0.155) (0.158) (0.215) 
     
Observations 384 384 384 384 
Number of countries 71 71 71 71 
Hansen J Test 37.21930 41.29330 35.58132 39.44921 
Hansen J P-value 0.681 0.502 0.747 0.584 
AR (1) -2.315 -2.283 -2.388 -2.392 
AR(1) p-value 0.0206 0.0224 0.0169 0.0168 
AR (2) -0.761 -1.056 -0.809 -0.883 
AR(2) p-value 0.447 0.291 0.419 0.377 
Note: Dependent variable is productivity growth. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether GMM type instruments are 
correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that GMM type instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
terms). AR (1) p-value refers to whether there is a first degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. AR (2) 
p-value refers to whether there is a second degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. Controls for 
country fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 3.10: GMM System Capital Growth Estimates with Legal Origin and Financial Structure Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Logarithm of Per capita beer consumption -0.0172    
 (0.0323)    
Logarithm of Per capita wine consumption   -0.0159   
  (0.0111)   
Logarithm of Per capita liquor consumption   0.0183  
   (0.0210)  
Logarithm of Per capita ethanol consumption    -0.000732 
    (0.0251) 
Commercial-Central Bank, period average 0.0935*** 0.0513 0.0793** 0.0682* 
 (0.0322) (0.0414) (0.0368) (0.0358) 
Bank Assets period, average -0.0341 -0.0124 -0.0263 -0.0530 
 (0.0252) (0.0356) (0.0439) (0.0366) 
Private Credit, period average 0.0645* 0.0511* 0.0768** 0.0737** 
 (0.0327) (0.0300) (0.0329) (0.0361) 
Liquid Liabilities, period average -0.0161 -0.00703 -0.0675 -0.00484 
 (0.0532) (0.0415) (0.0540) (0.0629) 
French legal origin 0.0216 0.0649 0.0321 0.0525 
 (0.0304) (0.0442) (0.0568) (0.0433) 
German legal origin -0.00835 0.0666 0.0359 0.0155 
 (0.0778) (0.0867) (0.100) (0.0908) 
Scandinavian legal origin -0.173 0.0324 -0.248 -0.113 
 (0.185) (0.0830) (0.218) (0.131) 
     
Observations 399 399 399 399 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 
Hansen J Test 39.28413 51.35572 47.00200 45.60459 
Hansen J P-value 0.591 0.153 0.275 0.325 
AR (1) -2.821 -2.624 -2.485 -2.599 
AR(1) p-value 0.00479 0.00868 0.0129 0.00934 
AR (2) -0.747 -0.806 -1.053 -0.942 
AR(2) p-value 0.455 0.420 0.292 0.346 
Note: Dependent variable is capital growth. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether GMM type instruments are 
correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that GMM type instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
terms). AR (1) p-value refers to whether there is a first degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. AR (2) 
p-value refers to whether there is a second degree serial correlation in the difference regressions. Controls for 
country fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Alcohol Abuse and Crime: A State Level Investigation 
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I. Introduction  
This chapter of the dissertation investigates the relationship between state level aggregate 
crime measures and alcohol abuse and therefore attempts to uncover the aggregate effect of 
alcohol abuse from a different angle.
26
  Various studies examined the link between alcohol 
consumption and availability of alcohol on criminal behavior.  
According to Cook and Moore (1993a), a large number of crimes are committed by 
people who just consumed alcohol.  Cook and Moore (1993b) find that alcohol availability 
increases alcohol consumption which in turn increases crime.  
According to Lang and Sibrel (1989) and Scribner et al (1999), alcohol affects criminal 
behavior by either pharmaco-physiological way by either impairing reasoning or reducing 
inhibition.  Therefore, alcohol acts as a catalyst rather than being the pure cause of criminal 
activity.  
Chaloupka and Weschler (1996) show that lower alcohol prices and alcohol availability 
are positively correlated with binge drinking and crime rates among US college students.  
Further, they find that crime rates are substantially higher among college students when alcohol 
is available on campus than when it is not. 
 An increase in the price of pure alcohol, as measured by a weighted average of the price 
of alcohol from beer, wine, and liquor, will reduce violence aimed at wives Markowitz and 
Grossman (2000).  Markowitz and Grossman (1998) show that increases in beer taxes can be an 
                                                            
26 The term alcohol abuse is preferred to alcohol consumption again because it is trivial that criminal activity 
induced by alcohol consumption can only happen if alcohol abuse for which a definition is provided in the first 
chapter.  
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effective policy tool in decreasing violence against children.  The price of beer is inversely 
related to violence in college campuses Markowitz and Grossman (2001). 
Hutchinson et al. (1995) show a disproportionately high number of crime incidences 
happen in or near pubs during the peak hours of operation in the United Kingdom.  By using 
census tract data from the city of Detroit, Gymah-Brempong (2001) shows that
 
alcohol 
availability is positively and significantly related to total, property and violent crime rates and 
homicide rates.  Gyimah-Brempong and Racine (2006) show by applying robust nonparametric 
methods that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between crime rates and 
alcohol availability.  Zimmerman and Benson (2007) find a strong positive relationship between 
alcohol consumption and rape rates.  Their estimated elasticity per capita beer consumption 
elasticity of rape is about 1.7. 
This study analyzes alcohol abuse crime relationship by utilizing per capita beer 
consumption as the representative measure of alcohol abuse by employing yearly state level data 
from the United States for the period 1982-2000.
27
  In order to account for the potential 
endogeneity between alcohol abuse (per capita beer consumption) and crime, a two stage least 
squares method is employed, utilizing excise beer taxes and state level alcohol control policies as 
instruments.  Results confirm the past literature which finds a positive relationship between 
alcohol abuse (i.e., per capita beer consumption) and state level aggregate crime.  The 
relationship is not uniform among different crime types.  It is larger in magnitude with respect to 
violent crime types in comparison to property crime types.  The relationship between alcohol 
abuse and crime seem to be strongest in the case of rape with an elasticity of about 0.72.  
                                                            
27 The evidence with respect to the representativeness of per-capita beer consumption as a measure of alcohol abuse 
is presented in Chapter I.  
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The next section continues with discussion of theoretical relationship between alcohol 
abuse and crime.  Section 3 presents the data and empirical methodology.  Section 4 presents the 
results.  Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
II. Identifying the Alcohol Abuse Crime Relationship 
 The relationship between alcohol consumption and crime can either be causal, in which 
alcohol consumption can induce or facilitate criminal activity, or spurious, in which alcohol 
consumption and crime may emerge as a result of a third factor.  
 Alcohol abuse may induce, or facilitate criminal behavior through different channels.  
Alcohol abuse can reduce the productivity of a person in the legal sector in comparison to the 
illegal sector.  As a result, instead of getting a regular job a person may prefer to be involved in 
illegal activities.  Alcohol abuse may as well increase a person‘s violent behavior by triggering a 
person‘s violent tendencies.  This may be through a reduction in the ability to assess risk due to 
excessive consumption or as a result of unexplained behavioral changes as a result of alcohol 
consumption.  In some cases, alcohol consumption abuse may alter the potential victim‘s 
defending ability.  For example, a female‘s ability to defend herself against a rape offender or to 
avoid from a potential rape offense can severely be hindered as a result of her own alcohol 
excessive drinking.  Likewise, ceteris paribus, an intoxicated person can be a much easier target 
for a robber in comparison to a sober person. 
 The correlation between crime and alcohol abuse (consumption) may be based on a 
spurious relationship in some cases, as well.  Age structure of population can affect criminal 
behavior and alcohol abuse simultaneously: people who are in prime age group (i.e., between 17 
and 65) are more likely to drink more and commit crime and therefore both crime and alcohol 
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abuse can be expected to be observed together.  Presence of alcohol abuse may increase a crime 
offender‘s chances of getting caught and hence alcohol abuse and crime can be observed 
together.  In some cases, a crime offender may choose to drink alcohol in order to reduce the 
severity of punishment in case s/he gets caught, which naturally leads to a positive correlation 
between crime and alcohol consumption.  Similarly, a criminal may choose to drink before he 
commits a crime in order to prepare himself mentally ready for the act of crime. The positive 
correlation between crime and alcohol consumption (abuse) may result from the personal 
characteristics of criminals.  That is, if people who prefer risky activities (such as crime) also 
prefer consuming alcohol, the correlation between crime and alcohol consumption will be 
positive as well.  If some outlets induce gathering and interaction of people who prefer both to 
consume alcohol and take risky behavior, in such areas a positive correlation between alcohol 
consumption and crime emerges.  Such environments may also attract criminals since search 
costs to find a potential victim is likely to be lower in such areas.  For instance, a person who 
intends to rape someone may target the night life friendly areas of a city or a town and thus may 
be drinking while searching for his potential victim as well.  This possibly can lead to a positive 
correlation between crime and alcohol consumption.  
 Based on the arguments presented above, a positive correlation between alcohol 
consumption and crime is expected.  However, whether such correlation represents the causal 
relationship between alcohol abuse and crime is an empirical matter.  The next section continues 
with presenting data and empirical methodology.  
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III. Data and Empirical Methodology 
Data
28
 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics.  The dependent variable is the crime rate.  
Crime is divided into two broad categories: property crime and violent crime.  Property crime 
includes robbery, larceny-theft, motor-vehicle-theft, and burglary.  Violent crime includes 
murder, rape, and aggravated assault.  Data on yearly state-level reported crime rates are taken 
from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), published by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
from 1982 to 2000.  Crime rates which refers to crime per 100,000 people.  These measures 
represent reported crime rates to the police.  However, many victims fail to report crime 
incidences for various reasons such as pride, fear of reprisal, relative importance of the crime to 
the victim, and expecting that the problem will not be resolved.  Underreporting of crime rates 
would be a more pressing problem if we were to use cross-sectional data.  Since I am using panel 
data, variation over time in addition to cross-sectional variation can still explain a lot as long as 
underreporting follows a consistent path.  Hence, in the remaining part of the analysis the 
consistency of the underreporting of crime rates over time is assumed.   
Per capita beer consumption, which is the variable of interest reflecting the per capita 
pure ethanol taken through the consumption of beer, is calculated based on population 14 years 
and older.  Data on population and age structure of population are taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Data on prisoners per 100,000 citizens, and the total number of full-time equivalent 
persons employed in police protection services per 100,000 citizens come from the Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics (various years), U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Regional 
Economic Accounts (state population various years), and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
                                                            
28 The author is grateful to Paul R. Zimmerman, and Bruce L. Benson for very generously sharing their data from 
Zimmerman and Benson (2004).  
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Data on the unemployment rate, the percent of population living below the poverty rate, and the 
percent of population residing in metropolitan areas come from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States of the U.S. Census Bureau.  Data on total private SIC manufacturing wage and 
salary disbursements divided by total private SIC manufacturing employment come from 
Regional Economic Accounts. 
Empirical Methodology 
 The empirical estimation is based on economics of crime approach introduced by Becker 
(1968).  The aggregate supply of criminal offenses model, developed by Gymah-Brempong 
(2001), which is based on Becker (1968), Erlhich (1973) and Eide (1998), is used.  The model 
asserts that criminal behavior depends positively on the benefit derived from criminal behavior 
while it depends negatively on cost of criminal behavior.  The model assumes that alcohol 
consumption causes the consumer to either over-estimate the benefits or under-estimate the costs 
of criminal activity.  Furthermore, the model assumes that the proportions of the population who 
consume alcohol are involved in crime either as the criminal or the victim of the criminal 
activity.  In the model, per capita beer consumption levels reflect the effect the alcohol abuse 
which in turn facilitates criminal activity.  
 Equation (1) is the longitudinal model estimated: 
tststststs ZXCrime ,,2,1, )ln(      (1) 
where subscripts s and t refer to state and time, respectively. State fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and an idiosyncratic error term are denoted by tsts and ,,,  , respectively.  Left hand 
side of the argument refers to crime measures, which are total crime rates and its components 
which are divided as violent crime rates or property crime rates. Dependent variable is the 
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natural logarithm of crime rate, which refers to crime rate per 100,000 population.  Violent crime 
and property crime rates are also divided into their sub-categories.  Violent crime is composed of 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault and murder.  Property crime is composed of motor vehicle 
theft, larceny theft, and burglary.  X refers to variables of interest, which are natural log of 
alcohol per capita beer consumption.  Therefore, since both sides of the equation are in natural 
logarithm form, coefficients of interest refer to elasticities.  Vector Z consists of control 
variables.  Lagged crime rates control for the learning curve and various other unobservable 
factors related to crime.  Crime in the last period is a predictor of the crime in the current period.  
There are two variables pertaining to deterrent factors: number of police per 100,000 and number 
of prisoners per 100,000.  Police is theoretically expected to be negatively correlated to crime 
rates since it is a deterrent factor.  Nevertheless, because of the potential endogeneity of number 
of policy officers to crime rates, the estimated coefficient can be positive as well.  The 
coefficient on the numbers of prisoners is expected to have a negative impact on crime rates for 
two reasons: first, it may be a deterrent factor since it can cause potential criminals to think that 
they will be incarcerated if they commit a crime; second, if criminals are in prison, they will 
evidently be incapacitated.  Unemployment rate and poverty rate control for the opportunity cost 
of crime.  That is, when unemployment rates and poverty rates are low, relative returns to 
criminal activities are low as well.  Therefore, the expected sign on them is theoretically positive.  
Following Zimmerman and Benson (2007), consumer price index (CPI) adjusted hourly wage in 
the manufacturing sector (Low Wage) is used as the third measure of relative attractiveness of 
jobs in the legal sector.  The reasoning behind using Low Wage instead of other measures of 
income is the fact that Low Wage seem to be more binding in comparison to other measures of 
income.  For instance, Freeman (1996) finds that educational attainment is lower among 
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criminals in comparison to non-criminals.  The variable potentially less criminal populations, 
which is percentage of population above 65 years old plus percentage of population below 17, 
controls for demographic factors that can influence crime rates via supply of potential criminals.  
Furthermore, people between 15-65 both drink more and are more likely to be involved in 
criminal activities.  Hence, controlling for such age group also controls for one of sources of 
endogeneity between drinking and crime.  Furthermore, in rape regressions percentage of 
females between ages 15-21 is also controlled since this group of population is more likely to be 
rape victims.  Percent of population living in metro areas controls for the impact of population 
density on crime rates.  
Potential Endogeneity of Per Capita Beer Consumption to Crime Rates 
Alcohol consumption may be endogenous to crime rates for different reasons: a criminal 
may drink alcohol before committing a crime to prepare himself psychologically in order to 
execute the crime; a criminal may drink alcohol before committing a crime in order to reduce the 
potential punishment associated with criminal activity; alcohol consumption and crime may be 
an outcome of a person‘s unobserved characteristics such as risky behavior; alcohol consumption 
may increase an offender‘s chances of getting caught.  Mentioned factors can reduce the 
credibility of OLS estimates of the impact of per capita beer consumption on crime may on the 
causal relationship between crime and alcohol abuse.  Therefore, in order to control the potential 
endogeneity between crime and per-capita beer consumption, an instrumental variable approach, 
in which excise beer taxes and some alcohol control policies are employed as instruments, is 
undertaken.  CPI adjusted excise beer taxes, whether a state has DUI Administration Per Se Law, 
Minimum Drinking Age, whether a state has Keg registration Law, whether a state has Open 
Container Law, whether a state has server training laws, and whether a state has Youth Blood 
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Alcohol Content law are the utilized instruments. First stage F-test value, first state partial R-
squared value and first stage F-test p-value is presented in the estimates.  As it could be inferred 
from the first stage F-test, partial R-squared, and F-test p-values, the instruments employed are 
statistically significant predictors of per capita beer consumption. Table 4.8 presents the first 
stage estimates of determinants of beer consumption.  The exogenous instruments are jointly 
significant at one percent level. Log of excise beer tax and server training law are statistically 
significant at one and five percent, respectively.  The coefficients are also at the expected 
direction.  The fact that instruments are statistically significantly correlated to per capita beer 
consumption satisfies one of the conditions for being valid instruments.  The second condition 
for the instruments to be valid instruments is the exclusion restriction (i.e., instruments should 
not be correlated with the error term).  In order to test the validity of the instruments an over-
identification test, Hansen J. test, is undertaken.  Tables pertaining to instrumental variables 
estimates present Hansen J. test, and Hansen J. test p-values.  The null hypothesis is that 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms.    
IV. Results 
 In all regressions state and year fixed effects are controlled for.  In addition, all the 
standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
OLS Estimates 
Table 4.2 presents the OLS estimates of total crime rates.  The per capita beer 
consumption elasticity of crime rate is 0.123 and it is statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  The coefficient on lagged crime rate is not presented.  The coefficient on log of prisoners 
is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level.  The coefficient on log of police 
is positive but not statistically significant. Likewise, the coefficients on unemployment rate and 
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poverty rate are both small and statistically insignificant. Metropolitan rate is positively 
associated with crime and it is significant at the five percent level.  Percent (under 17 + over 65) 
is negatively correlated to total crime rate and it is statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  The coefficient on low wage is negative though it is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  
Table 4.3 presents the OLS estimates of property crime and its components.  The 
coefficient of log of per capita beer consumption is 0.130, 0.179 and 0.134 for property crime 
rate, burglary rate, and larceny rate and they each are statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  The coefficient on motor vehicle theft rate is positive but not statistically significant.  
Control variables are close to those in total crime rate regression for which the results are 
presented in Table 4.2.  The coefficients on log of prisoners and percent (under 17 + over 65) are 
statistically significant at conventional levels in each case.  
Table 4.4 presents the OLS estimates of violent crime and its components.  The 
coefficient on log of per capita beer is statistically significant only in column (4), in which 
robbery rate is the dependent variable.  In all other cases the coefficient on per capita beer 
consumption is not statistically significant.  The coefficients on metropolitan rate, percent (under 
17 + over 65), and log of low wage is statistically significant in about 60 percent of the 
specifications.  The coefficient on log of prisoners is statistically significant only in column (4), 
in which robbery rate is the dependent variable.  Percent female 15-21 is positively and 
statistically significantly related rape rates.  
OLS estimates show a positive relationship between per capita beer consumption and 
various crime types in general.  However, for the reasons discussed earlier, OLS estimates may 
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not reflect the causal relationship between per capita beer consumption and crime rates.  Next, I 
present instrumental variable estimates of crime rates.  
Instrumental Variables Estimates 
Table 4.5 shows results for instrumental variable estimation of total crime rate.  The 
coefficient on log of per capita beer consumption is 0.250, which is about twice as much as the 
coefficient in OLS estimations.  Hence, a ten percent increase in per capita beer consumption 
leads to a 2.5 percent increase in total crime rate.  Hansen J test p-value shows that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms.  
Table 4.6 presents the results for instrumental variable estimates of property crime and its 
components.  The property crime elasticity of per capita beer consumption is 0.253 and it is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  The coefficient on burglary crime is positive but 
not statistically significant at conventional levels.  The elasticity between larceny theft rate and 
per capita beer consumption is 0.335.  That is, a ten percent increase in per capita beer 
consumption leads to a 3.35 percent increase in larceny theft rate.  In column (4), which presents 
the estimation of motor vehicle theft rate, the coefficient on per capita beer consumption is both 
negative and statistically insignificant.  Therefore, per capita beer consumption is statistically 
significantly related only to larceny theft rate among property crime types.  Hansen J test values 
and first stage F-test values show that the instruments are valid instruments.  
Table 4.7 presents the results for instrumental variable estimates of violent crime and its 
components.  In violent crime regressions, the coefficient on per capita beer consumption is only 
statistically significant in two cases: in estimations of rape rates and robbery rates.  The 
coefficient is not statistically significant in estimations of violent crime, murder rate, and 
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aggravated assault rates.  The rape rate elasticity of per capita beer consumption is 0.719 (i.e., a 
10 percent increase in per-capita beer consumption leads to a 7.19 percent increase in rape rates). 
The robbery rate elasticity of per capita beer consumption is 0.564 (i.e., a ten percent increase in 
per capita beer consumption leads to a 5.64 percent increase in robbery rates).  
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
These results show that alcohol abuse has a positive impact on crime rates.  However, the 
effect is not uniform among different crime types.  In general the coefficient on per capita beer 
consumption is larger in violent crime regressions in comparison to property crime types.  These 
results are consistent with Grossman and Markowitz (1998) and (2000).  Hence, increases in beer 
sales cause an increase in criminal activity. 
When it comes to interpreting whether these results are plausible, a careful approach 
should be undertaken.  That is, in interpreting the meaningfulness of these estimates, nature of 
data and its limitations, and nature of particular crime types should be taken into consideration.  
Considering that property crime has three subcomponents and violent crime has four 
subcomponents, the coefficient on per capita beer consumption is only statistically significant in 
three cases: larceny theft rate; rape rate; and robbery rate.  The theoretical relationship between 
rape rate and alcohol abuse is more apparent than the other crime types.  That is, most rape 
incidences include victim offender interaction and both the victim and offender may be under the 
influence of alcohol.  The theoretical relationship between alcohol consumption and crime is not 
very apparent in the cases of larceny theft rate and robbery rate.  
A careful reading of these results suggests interesting patterns with respect to the alcohol 
abuse and crime relationship.  In property crime regressions, alcohol abuse seems to affect a less 
organized crime type, larceny theft rate, in comparison burglary rate and motor vehicle theft rate.  
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Apparently, larceny theft requires less of an organization than burglary and mother vehicle theft 
and it is subject to less severe punishment in comparison to burglary.  Therefore, with respect to 
property crime types, the role of alcohol is more pronounced when the severity of crime is lower.  
These results do not exclude a possible relationship between crime types that requires higher 
level or organization and alcohol abuse.  These results show that alcohol control policies can be 
effective tools in reducing less severe property crime types while they may not be effective 
policy tools to reduce burglary rate and motor vehicle theft rate.  In violent crime regressions, the 
relationship between alcohol abuse and crime is more pressing for less violent crime types (i.e., 
per capita beer consumption is not statistically significantly related to murder rates).  As is 
documented by Zimmerman and Benson (2007), the relationship between alcohol abuse and rape 
is positive and significant.  The fact that the coefficient on the robbery rate is larger in 
comparison, the coefficient on aggravated assault rate may raise questions with respect to the 
credibility of these estimates since robbery seem to require more organization in comparison to 
aggravated assault.  One possible explanation supporting the findings of this research is that 
when aggravated assault and larceny theft occur together, the executed crime is classified as 
robbery (Uniform Crime Reports 2000).  Hence, it is likely that measurement error with respect 
to robbery and aggravated assault may affect the magnitudes and statistical significance of the 
coefficients.  Similar to the property crime, alcohol control policies may be effective tools in 
reducing some violent crime types, which are rape, robbery and aggravated assault, but not 
murder. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable (1) 
Total crime rate 4783.6 
 (1280.836) 
Property crime rate 4295.928 
 (1097.301) 
Burglary rate 1015.524 
 (367.1607) 
Larceny theft rate 2872.495 
 (687.0186) 
Motor vehicle theft rate 407.9096 
 (218.5896) 
Violent crime rate 487.6722 
 (254.6622) 
Murder rate 6.4093 
 (3.5306) 
Rape rate 35.6634 
 (13.1191) 
Robbery rate 142.3363 
 (105.8607) 
Aggravated assault rate 303.2604 
 (160.6062) 
Prisoners 257.4348 
 (130.5488) 
Police  260.4598 
 (50.5408) 
% Unemployment 5.8141 
 (2.0438) 
% Poverty 13.2512 
 (4.0932) 
% Metro 65.5824 
 (21.7579) 
%  population under17 + above 65 40.171 
 (2.5015) 
Log of low wage 3.3182 
 (0.2619) 
% Males Ages 18-29 9.1895 
 (1.1673) 
% Males Ages 40-60 11.358 
 (1.2456) 
% Females Ages 15-21 5.1419 
 (0.5636) 
Observations 864 
   Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2: Fixed Effects Estimate of Total Crime Rate 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Total Crime Rate 
  
Log of per capita beer consumption 0.123*** 
 (0.0424) 
Log of prisoners -0.0494** 
 (0.0185) 
Log of Police 0.0277 
 (0.0472) 
Unemployment rate 0.000189 
 (0.00207) 
Poverty Rate -0.00127 
 (0.000993) 
Metropolitan Rate 0.00159** 
 (0.000787) 
Percent (under 17 + over 65) -0.00996*** 
 (0.00276) 
Log of low wage -0.0450 
 (0.0375) 
  
Observations 912 
Number of states 48 
R-squared 0.867 
Note: Dependent variable is log of total crime rate. Controls for state fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant 
term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4.3: Fixed Effects Estimates of Property Crime and its Components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Property Burglary Larceny M-vehicle 
     
Log of per capita beer consumption 0.130*** 0.179*** 0.134*** 0.0897 
 (0.0430) (0.0579) (0.0475) (0.0890) 
Log of prisoners -0.0535*** -0.0619** -0.0431** -0.113*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0265) (0.0179) (0.0381) 
Log of Police 0.0301 0.0151 0.0788* -0.115 
 (0.0467) (0.0634) (0.0458) (0.0974) 
Unemployment rate 0.000555 0.00558** 3.52e-05 -0.00586 
 (0.00207) (0.00251) (0.00199) (0.00408) 
Poverty Rate -0.00146 -0.00144 -0.00136 -0.00305* 
 (0.00107) (0.00135) (0.00115) (0.00165) 
Metropolitan Rate 0.00129* 0.000941 0.000985 0.00489** 
 (0.000766) (0.000742) (0.000799) (0.00183) 
Percent (under 17 + over 65) -0.0102*** -0.0171*** -0.00676* -0.0176*** 
 (0.00282) (0.00314) (0.00354) (0.00633) 
Log of low wage -0.0405 -0.0138 -0.0561 -0.0644 
 (0.0391) (0.0573) (0.0356) (0.0955) 
     
Observations 912 912 912 912 
R-squared 0.867 0.924 0.824 0.844 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 
Note: Dependent variable is log of crime rate labeled in each column. Controls for state fixed effects, year dummies, 
and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effects Estimates of Violent Crime and its Components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Violent Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
      
Log of per capita beer consumption 0.107 -0.0403 0.0753 0.236** 0.0828 
 (0.0685) (0.229) (0.0966) (0.112) (0.0828) 
Log of prisoners -0.0130 -0.143 0.0323 -0.0759* 0.00270 
 (0.0252) (0.0876) (0.0315) (0.0431) (0.0298) 
Log of Police -0.00591 0.130 -0.0727 -0.0713 0.0625 
 (0.0880) (0.195) (0.0966) (0.106) (0.0974) 
Unemployment rate -0.00191 -0.0122 -0.000937 -0.000523 -0.00356 
 (0.00344) (0.00894) (0.00351) (0.00559) (0.00486) 
Poverty Rate 0.000314 -0.000706 0.00170 0.00164 -0.000544 
 (0.00140) (0.00473) (0.00201) (0.00243) (0.00190) 
Metropolitan Rate 0.00489*** -0.00421 0.000735 0.00368** 0.00543** 
 (0.00156) (0.00377) (0.00161) (0.00148) (0.00204) 
Percent (under 17 + over 65) -0.00932* -0.0318** -0.0398*** -0.0173*** -0.00227 
 (0.00538) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.00638) (0.00785) 
Log of low wage -0.163** 0.196 -0.0662 -0.00658 -0.197** 
 (0.0644) (0.239) (0.122) (0.102) (0.0897) 
Yfemale   0.0767***   
   (0.0239)   
      
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 
R-squared 0.817 0.328 0.748 0.749 0.779 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 
Note: Dependent variable is log of crime rate labeled in each column. Controls for state fixed effects, year dummies, 
and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
     
`
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Table 4.5: Instrumental Variable Estimation of Total Crime Rate 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Total Crime Rate 
  
Log of per capita beer consumption  0.250* 
 (0.140) 
Log of prisoners -0.0543*** 
 (0.0151) 
Log of Police 0.00842 
 (0.0387) 
Unemployment rate 0.00272 
 (0.00241) 
Poverty Rate -0.000980 
 (0.00104) 
Metropolitan Rate 0.000955 
 (0.000864) 
Percent (under 17 + over 65) -0.00928** 
 (0.00377) 
Log of low wage -0.0368 
 (0.0424) 
  
Observations 869 
Number of states 48 
R-squared 0.860 
Hansen J Test 2.460 
Hansen J P-value 0.873 
1st F-test 11.03 
1st p-value 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.084 
Note: Dependent variable is log total crime rate. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether are correlated with the error 
term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms). 1st F-test pertains to the 
first stage F-test value. 1st p-value pertains to the p value of the first stage F-test. 1st partial R2 pertains to the partial 
R-squared. Controls for state fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Property Crime and its Components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Property Burglary Larceny M-vehicle 
     
Log of per capita beer consumption 0.253* 0.214 0.335** -0.0677 
 (0.142) (0.175) (0.160) (0.227) 
Log of prisoners -0.0595*** -0.0640*** -0.0475*** -0.135*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0195) (0.0156) (0.0350) 
Log of Police 0.0100 -0.00117 0.0591 -0.107 
 (0.0386) (0.0571) (0.0402) (0.0875) 
Unemployment rate 0.00310 0.00613* 0.00363 -0.00541 
 (0.00248) (0.00317) (0.00261) (0.00438) 
Poverty Rate -0.00119 -0.00126 -0.000978 -0.00366 
 (0.00106) (0.00131) (0.00111) (0.00225) 
Metropolitan Rate 0.000655 0.000695 0.000136 0.00460** 
 (0.000876) (0.00101) (0.000978) (0.00194) 
Percent (under 17 + over 65) -0.00964** -0.0167*** -0.00545 -0.0224*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00477) (0.00425) (0.00710) 
Log of low wage -0.0336 -0.0141 -0.0433 -0.0824 
 (0.0433) (0.0497) (0.0459) (0.0779) 
     
Observations 869 869 869 869 
R-squared 0.860 0.922 0.817 0.842 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 
Hansen J Test 2.276 9.635 4.339 8.366 
Hansen J P-value 0.893 0.141 0.631 0.213 
1st F-test 10.83 10.55 9.89 16.32 
1st p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.084 0.087 0.074 0.116 
Note: Dependent variable is log of the crime rate labeled in each column. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether are 
correlated with the error term (i.e. the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms). 
1st F-test pertains to the first stage F-test value. 1st p-value pertains to the p value of the first stage F-test. 1st partial 
R2 pertains to the partial R-squared. Controls for state fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4.7: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Violent Crime and its Components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Violent Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
      
Log of per capita beer consumption 0.288 -0.247 0.719** 0.564** 0.195 
 (0.194) (0.470) (0.313) (0.276) (0.248) 
Log of prisoners -0.00621 -0.164*** 0.0770** -0.0801*** 0.00742 
 (0.0231) (0.0632) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0294) 
Log of Police -0.0346 0.166 -0.176* -0.124 0.0449 
 (0.0858) (0.177) (0.104) (0.100) (0.109) 
Unemployment rate 0.000280 -0.0116 0.00638 0.00483 -0.00272 
 (0.00350) (0.0105) (0.00514) (0.00494) (0.00441) 
Poverty Rate 0.000808 -0.000365 0.00200 0.00237 0.000149 
 (0.00167) (0.00498) (0.00265) (0.00260) (0.00218) 
Metropolitan Rate 0.00423*** -0.00378 -0.00113 0.00222 0.00482*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00403) (0.00208) (0.00196) (0.00178) 
Percent (under 17 + over 65) -0.00715 -0.0402** -0.0271* -0.0138 -0.000699 
 (0.00622) (0.0170) (0.0144) (0.00888) (0.00874) 
Log of low wage -0.139* 0.134 0.00285 0.00257 -0.163 
 (0.0818) (0.211) (0.122) (0.0960) (0.103) 
Yfemale   0.0856***   
   (0.0219)   
      
Observations 869 869 869 869 869 
R-squared 0.814 0.329 0.723 0.748 0.778 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 
Hansen J Test 14.65 3.533 0.769 8.816 17.36 
Hansen J P-value 0.0232 0.740 0.993 0.184 0.00805 
1st F-test 12.55 12.01 9.85 10.58 12.72 
1st p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1st partial R2 0.094 0.095 0.085 0.086 0.096 
Note: Dependent variable is log of the crime rate labeled in each column. Hansen J test p-value refers to whether are 
correlated with the error term (i.e., the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms). 
1st F-test pertains to the first stage F-test value. 1st p-value pertains to the p value of the first stage F-test. 1st partial 
R2 pertains to the partial R-squared. Controls for state fixed effects, year dummies, and a constant term. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4.1: First Stage Estimation of Log of Per Capita Beer Consumption 
 (1) 
  
Log of excise beer tax -0.100*** 
 (0.0373) 
Administration Per Se Law  -0.00686 
 (0.00858) 
Drinking Age -0.00203 
 (0.00628) 
Key Registration Law -0.0162 
 (0.0209) 
Open Container Law 0.00715 
 (0.0126) 
Server Training Law -0.0257** 
 (0.0111) 
Youth BAC Law -0.0111 
 (0.00808) 
  
Observations 869 
Number of states 48 
R-squared 0.621 
F-test p-vale 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of per capita beer consumption. F-test p-value pertains to the joint significance 
of exogenous instruments. Controls for all the control variables in the estimated specifications, state fixed effects, 
year dummies, and a constant term. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1: Alcohol Consumption Data Information for Essay II 
―Estimated amount of pure ethanol in liters of total alcohol, and separately beer, wine and spirits 
consumed per adult (15 years and older) in the country during a calendar year, as calculated from 
official statistics on production, sales, import and export, taking into account stocks whenever 
possible. Conversion factors used to estimate amount of pure alcohol in (barley) beer is 5.0%, 
wine 12% and spirits 40% of alcohol (other conversion factors were used for some types of beer 
and other beverages). Data are collected and calculations made mainly using three sources: 
FAOSTAT - United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization`s Statistical Database, World 
Drink Trends, regularly published by Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken (Netherlands) 
and in some cases direct government data. Data is available for most countries of the world since 
1961 onwards. Data is presented for the groups of total, and also beer, wine and spirits 
separately. The category beer includes data on barley, maize, millet and sorghum beer combined. 
Please note that the amounts from beer, wine and spirits do not necessarily add up to the 
presented total, as in some cases the total includes other beverage categories, such as palm wine, 
vermouths, cider, fruit wines etc. 
It is important to note that these figures comprise in most cases of the recorded alcohol 
consumption only and have some inherent problems. Factors which influence the accuracy of per 
capita data are: informal production, tourist and overseas consumption, stockpiling, waste and 
spillage, smuggling, duty-free sales, variation in beverage strength and the quality of the data 
whereupon it is based. In some countries there exists a significant unrecorded alcohol 
consumption that should be added for a comprehensive picture of total alcohol consumption‖.29 
 
                                                            
29 Copied from WHO alcohol database.  
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